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LOSS OF USE DAMAGES FOR INJURIES TO
INTERESTS IN COMMERCIAL CHATTELS
I.

Introduction

When a chattel used for either commercial' or noncommercial'
purposes is damaged3 or destroyed 4 by a defendant's wrongful conduct,' a frequently litigated issue has been the appropriate measure
of damages6 for the period7 of time that the owner has been deprived
of the use of his chattel.
The issue arises most frequently when a negligent driver damages
1. See infra notes 210-35 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 229-48 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 212, 221-25 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
5. These tortious injuries include: negligent damage to the chattel, see Rogers
v. Nelson, 97 N.H. 72, 80 A.2d 391 (1951); destruction of the chattel, see Stevens
v. Mid-Continent Invs., Inc., 257 Ark. 439, 517 S.W.2d 208 (1974); conversion, see
Brown v. Southwestern R.R., 36 Ga. 377 (1867); wrongful detention, see Buckley
v. Buckley, 12 Nev. 423 (1877); breach of contract, see Northern Petrochemical Co.
v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 297 Minn. 118, 211 (N.W.2d 159 (1973); breach of
warranty, see Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Air Co., 97 Idaho
348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975), as well as any other tort that deprives the owner of the
property's beneficial use.
6. See generally R. BYRN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES VII 2-19 (1984).
7. Although the vast majority of modern loss of use cases involves collisions
or deprivations of some form of transportation, such as a car, see Rogers v.
Nelson, 97 N.H. 72, 80 A.2d 391 (1951); a bus, see Mountain View Coach Lines,
Inc. v. Storms, 102 A.D.2d 663, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918 (2d Dep't 1984) (Mountain
View III); an airplane, see Young, Inc. v. Servair, Inc., 33 Mich. App. 643, 190
N.W.2d 316 (1971); or a boat, see Williams v. Eckert, 643 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1982),
the same principles which apply to those cases are equally applicable to cases
involving other items of property. See, e.g., Gila Water Co. v. Gila Land and
Cattle Co., 28 Ariz. 531, 238 P. 336 (1925) (water); Gregory v. Walker, 239 Ark.
415, 389 S.W.2d 892 (1965) (crops); NorthAmerican Van Lines v. Roper, 429 So.
2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (furniture); Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678
F.2d 942 (lth Cir. 1982) (applying Georgia law) (travelling ship unloader); Krick
v. First Nat'l Bank, 8 Ill. App. 3d 663, 290 N.E.2d 661 (1972) (home); Columbia
Gas, Inc. v. Maynard, 532 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1975) (building); Bos v. Dolajak, 167
Mont. 1, 534 P.2d 1258 (1975) (silo); Baburek v. Skomal, 176 Neb. 832, 127
N.W.2d 731 (1964) (apartment); Buckley v. Buckley, 12 Nev. 423 (1877) (cows);
Cornwell v. LaPlante, 108 N.H. 490, 238 A.2d 727 (1968) (barn); Interpool, Ltd.
v. Universal Maritime Servs., 1983 A.M.C. 1082 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1983) (cargo shipping containers); Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562 (1873) (horse); Schalscha
v. Third Ave. R.R., 19 Misc. 141, 43 N.Y.S. 251 (1st Dep't 1897) (violin); Fredeen
v. Stride, 269 Or. 369, 525 P.2d 166 (1974) (dog); Shepherd v. Hub Lumber Co.,
273 Or. 331, 541 P.2d 439 (1975) (log skidder); FHA v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031
(Wyo. 1985) (grazing rights).
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or destroys a chattel,' such as the plaintiff's motor vehicle, in an
accident.' Assuming, for the purposes of this Note, that the driver was solely responsible, the issue is what damages may the
plaintiff recover? It is universally accepted that he is entitled to
compensation for the physical damage to his vehicle, but awarding
this amount alone fails to take into account that the vehicle cannot
be repaired or replaced immediately.' 0 Thus, in addition to the cost
of repair, most courts award the plaintiff compensation for this
period of lost use." Although seemingly a simple enough proposition,
courts have struggled with measuring the value of the lost use, and
have as yet failed to adopt a wholly satisfactory resolution. 2 The
problem is exacerbated in cases dealing with more complex chattels
such as a commercial aircraft, 3 cargo shipping containers, 4 or a
private pleasure yacht.'" The problems increase in these cases because
of the absence of a readily obtainable replacement chattel or market
by which the value of use can be measured, as it could be on the
6
car rental market.'
The traditional rule at common law 7 allowed the owner of the
damaged property to recover only the difference between the market
value immediately before the damage occurred and immediately after. 8
Eventually, courts began to award owners interest on the pre-accident
market value of the chattel as an additional element of damages. 9
8. A chattel is defined as "an article of movable property as distinguished
from real property: furniture, automobiles, livestock, etc. are chattels." WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 127 (concise ed. 1969).
9. See infra note 184.
10. See infra notes 325-32.
11. See id.
12. Brownstein, What's The Use? A Doctrinal and Policy Critique of the
Measurement of Loss of Use Damages, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 433 (1985) [hereinafter
Brownstein]. The author suggests that although courts have come to award loss
of use damages routinely, the rationale for these awards is neither consistent nor
wholly coherent as a body of law. See id.
13. See, e.g., Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschaapij, N.V. (KLM) v. United
Tech. Corp. (UTC), 610 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
14. See, e.g., CTI Int'l, Inc. (CTI) v. Lloyds Underwriters, 735 F.2d 679 (2d
Cir. 1984).
15. See, e.g., Snavely v. Lang, 592 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1979).
16. See infra note 222.
17. The traditional common law rule is discussed in Part II of this Note. See
infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 51.
19. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 55, at 217-21
(1935) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
These courts likewise take the same stand with reference to claims sounding
in tort, for the value of property converted or destroyed, or for diminution
in value of property injured by defendant's wrong-that is, interest is
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Gradually, courts in most jurisdictions relaxed the traditional rule 20
and offered loss of use 21 as an alternative to simple diminution in
value plus interest: first, for damaged commercial chattels; 22 then
for damaged non-commercial, or pleasure, chattels;2 3 and finally for
total destruction 24 of commercial2 5 and pleasure 26 chattels. Although
the primary emphasis of this Note will be placed on loss of use of

commercial chattels, reference will necessarily be made to noncommercial chattels to delineate the different policy considerations applicable to the recovery of damages in each situation.
In the broadest sense, courts award loss of use damages to compensate the plaintiff for the defendant's wrongful interference with
27
the plaintiff's right to use or enjoy his property as he chooses.
Although some courts remain reluctant to award damages for an

injury so esoteric as the "right to use," '2 the modern trend is clearly

toward allowing recovery for loss of use whenever a tortious act
deprives an owner of the use of his chattel. 29

Within New York, no uniform rule of law30 definitively establishes
allowed as of right from the time when compensation ought to have
been made (generally the time of the wrong), if the values destroyed are
ascertainable with reference to known market prices ....

Interest as

damages is sometimes awarded for the loss of use of land or chattels
where the plaintiff has been wrongfully deprived of the use of his property
for a period but not permanently. Here interest on the value of the
property for the period of deprivation may be given as a substitute for
an attempt to measure the rental value or the value of the use of the
property.
Id.at 220-21.
20. See Annotation, Recovery for Loss of Use of Motor Vehicle Damaged or

Destroyed, 18 A.L.R.3d 497, 519 (1968), for jurisdictions that follow the modern
trend discussed more extensively in Part III.
21. Loss of use has been defined as follows: "[tihe value of the use during
the period of detention or prevention or the value of the use of or the amount
paid for a substitute .... ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 931 (1977).
22. See infra notes 212, 221-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of
partial destruction of a chattel, and notes 187-205 and accompanying text for a
discussion of loss of use of commercial chattels.
23. See infra notes 229-50 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 186-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
distinction drawn between loss of use of a damaged chattel and a chattel that
has been totally destroyed.
25. Id.
26. Id.

27. See, e.g., KLM, 610 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
28. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
29. See id.

30. Compare Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Hartnett, 99 Misc.2d 271,
272, 415 N.Y.S.2d 918, 918 (Greene County Ct. 1978) (Mountain View 1) ("[this
court does not accept that measure of damages [loss of use]"), aff'd, 69 A.D.2d
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if, and when, courts should award loss of use damages.3 In the
absence of guidance from the Court of Appeals,3 2 the lower New
33
York courts have been required to analyze and apply the doctrinal
3
6
35
and policy 34 considerations that underlie the award or denial of

37
loss of use damages. Two distinct interpretive rules have emerged.

The Third Department has refused to award such damages, at least
when no substitute chattel has actually been rented.3" In direct
contrast to this rule, and on indistinguishable facts, the Second
Department has allowed recovery for loss of use regardless of whether
or not a substitute was actually obtained.39
These cases involved damage to a commercial vehicle when the
plaintiff had a substitute on hand to replace the vehicle he had lost.
Different considerations may, of course, arise when no substitute
was on hand and a certain period of time had elapsed before the

owner was able to obtain a substitute. In addition, loss of use
damages are more difficult to measure when the chattel lost was
used merely for pleasure, and not in some commercial venture.
This Note will examine the evolution of the loss of use doctrine
from its early common law days to the present and suggest the

adoption of a universal rule for New York courts in cases involving
loss of use of a commercial chattel. Part II of this Note reviews
the traditional common law rule4 1 that denied recovery of loss of
use, and the reasons for refusing such recovery. 4' Part III traces

1020, 414 N.Y.S.2d 947 (3d Dep't 1979), appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 710, 393 N.E.2d
1050, 419 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1979) and Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Gehr,
80 A.D.2d 949, 439 N.Y.S.2d 632 (3d Dep't 1981) (Mountain View II) (refusing
to award loss of use damages in reliance upon Mountain View 1) with Mountain
View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 102 A.D.2d 663, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918 (2d Dep't
1984) (Mountain View III) (allowing loss of use damages on identical facts).
31. See supra note 20.
32. In Mountain View I, the New York State Court of Appeals declined to
review the Third Department's refusal to grant loss of use damages. 47 N.Y.2d
710, 393 N.E.2d 1050, 419 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1979). "Denial of leave to appeal by
the Court of Appeals is, of course, without precedential value." Mountain View
III, 102 A.D.2d 663, 665, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (2d Dep't 1984).
33. See infra notes 251-319 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 63-116 and accompanying text.
35. See Mountain View III, 102 A.D.2d 663, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918 (2d Dep't 1984).
36. See Mountain View HI, 80 A.D.2d 949, 439 N.Y.S.2d 632 (3d Dep't 1981);
Mountain View I, 99 Misc. 2d 271, 415 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Greene County Ct. 1978).
37. See supra note 30.
38. See supra note 36.
39. See supra note 35.
40. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 58-116 and accompanying text.
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the modern trend,"2 examining: (1)the socioeconomic policy considerations that underlie the denial of recovery;"3 (2) admiralty law
and its influence on the development of the loss of use doctrine;"
(3) the total destruction-partial destruction paradox; 4 and (4) the
commercial-pleasure distinction

6

A survey of the various methods

courts commonly use to measure the amount of damages will also
be undertaken. 47 Part IV sets out to establish what proof is required

to justify an award for loss of useA4 Part V examines the development
of the loss of use doctrine in New York.4 9 Finally, Part VI of this
Note concludes that courts should not deny a plaintiff recovery of

loss of use damages when he is wrongfully deprived of the use of
a commercial chattel, simply because he had used a substitute he

owned for just such an emergency to replace the damaged chattel,
instead of a replacement rented on the open market."
II.

The Traditional Rule

Prior to the modern development of the loss of use doctrine, an
owner of a damaged or destroyed chattel was not entitled to recover
damages for the loss of its use." The owner's recovery was limited
to the difference between the market value immediately before and
after the injury.5 2 If the chattel was amenable to repair, the owner
42. See infra notes 58-319 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 61-116 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 207-50 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 251-319 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 320-54 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 355-417 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 418-25 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Madison-Smith Cadillac Co. v. Wallace, 181 Ark. 715, 717-18,
27 S.W.2d 524, 525 (1930) (measure of damages is difference between value before
and after collision); Morgan Millwork Co. v. Dover Garage Co., 30 Del. 383, 386,
108 A. 62, 64 (Super. Ct. 1919) (difference in value before and after, no loss of
use allowed); Moll & Reiners v. Bark "George," & G.B. Post & Co., 1 Haw.
270, 271 (1856) (damages owner entitled to recover limited to interest on value of
vessel at beginning of wrongful detention plus compensation for any depreciation
in value during such detention); McLaughlin v. City of Bangor, 58 Me. 398, 400
(1870) (recovery limited to cost of repair); Fredenburgh v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.,
79 N.M. 593, 596, 446 P.2d 868, 871 (1968); Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211, 217
(1873) (award of damages for loss of use contrary to rule that plaintiff has no
right to be placed in better position than had wrong not occurred); Averett v.
Shircliff, 218 Va. 202, 207, 237 S.E.2d 92, 95-96 (1977) (measure of damages is
difference in value before and after accident or reasonable cost of restoring property
to its pre-accident condition).
52. SeeKane v. Carper-Dover Mercantile Co., 206 Ark. 674, 680, 177 S.W.2d
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was entitled to the cost of repair and, if the chattel could not be

fully restored to its pre-accident condition, any diminution in its
value after repair. 3 Several courts that have followed the traditional
rule have added the further limitation that if the chattel can be

restored to its pre-accident condition and the cost of repair would
in market value, the amount recoverable
be less than the diminution
4
repair.1
of
is the cost
Courts justified this restrictive damage formula on the theory that
an award of loss of use, in addition to diminution in market value,
would place the plaintiff in a better position than he would have
been in had the wrong never occurred at all. 5 Furthermore, it was
felt that loss of use damages were of such "uncertain a character,"
as to make accurate valuation of such loss impossible.16 One court
justified the denial of loss of use for a damaged automobile on the7

ground that the car had no usable value while it was being repaired.1

This rationale conveniently ignored the fact that it was defendant's

tortious conduct that rendered the chattel useless in the first place.
III.

The Modern Trend

The premise of the traditional common law rule was that when
a plaintiff recovered the cost of repairing a damaged chattel, the
diminution in market value or the full value of a destroyed chattel,
he had been fully compensated. 8 This Section will set forth the

rationales advanced to support the traditional rule in early loss of
use cases59 and then examine admiralty decisions involving loss of

41, 43 (1944) (measure of damages is difference in value before and after; does
not include loss of use as element of damages); Morgan Millwork Co. v. Dover
Garage Co., 30 Del. 383, 388, 108 A. 62, 64 (Super. Ct. 1919) (same); Fredenburgh
v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 79 N.M. 593, 596, 446 P.2d 868, 871 (1968) (either
difference in market value or cost of repair); Averett v. Shircliff, 218 Va. 202,
207, 237 S.E.2d 92, 95-96 (1977) (same); Purington v. Newton, 114 Vt. 490, 494,
49 A.2d 98, 100 (1946) (difference in market value immediately before and immediately after accident); Adkins v. Hinton, 149 W. Va. 613,"621, 142 S.E.2d
889, 895 (1965) (measure of damages for lost or destroyed- chattel is fair market
value thereof at time of loss or destruction).
53. Fredenburgh v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 79 N.M. 593, 596, 446 P.2d 868,
871 (1968).
54. See, e.g., Averett v. Shircliff, 218 Va. 202, 207, 237 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1977).
55. Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211, 217 (1873).
56. McLaughlin, 58 Me. at 400.
57. See Madison-Smith Cadillac Co. v. Wallace, 181 Ark. 715, 716, 27 S.W.2d
524, 525 (1930) (measure of damages is difference in value before and after collision).
58. See McLaughlin, 58 Me. at 400.
59. See infra notes 61-116 and accompanying text.
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use, which greatly influenced the general development of the loss
of use doctrine. 6°
A.

Socioeconomic Policy Considerations
Various socioeconomic policy considerations were advanced at early

6
common law to deny or limit recovery of loss of use damages.
Some courts have continued to rely on these antiquated doctrines
in refusing or limiting the award of loss of use damages. At least

one commentator maintains that, in a modern context, these ar62
guments have become archaic.

1. Speculative Nature of Loss of Use Damages
According to one argument, the absence of a basis for reasonably

ascertaining the monetary value 63 of the lost use of a chattel justifies
the denial of recovery. 64 Allowing recovery would "[open] the courts
to imagination and speculation ' 65 in determining damages. Under

the traditional rule, courts held that this particular element of the
damage equation was of such uncertain character that allowing
' 66
recovery would be "a step in the wrong direction."
Nevertheless, one authority has noted that there is no logical
reason to assume that calculating damages will necessarily be overly

speculative. 67 For instance, there is nothing speculative about the
cost of renting a car for the period during which the owner repairs
a damaged vehicle or replaces a destroyed vehicle. 68 In other areas

of tort law, computing damages with absolute certainty is not re60. See infra notes 117-206 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 63-115 and accompanying text.
62. See Note, Loss of Use As an Item of Damages in Admiralty Collision
Cases, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 311, 313 (1978) [hereinafter Admiralty Cases].
63. Hunter v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 30, 168 P. 918, 920 (1917) (involving
loss of use of an automobile used solely for noncommercial purposes).
64. Annotation, Recovery for Loss of Use of Motor Vehicle Damaged or
Destroyed, 18 A.L.R.3d 497, 506-07 (1968).
65. Snavely v. Lang, 592 F.2d 296, 300 (6th Cir. 1979).
66. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 58 Me. at 400, wherein the court stated:
If the article was wholly destroyed, we presume no one would think of
claiming damages for loss of the use of it, in addition to its full value.
And we see no reason why a different rule should prevail where the loss
is only temporary. It will take no longer to supply the loss in one case
than the other.
Id.
67. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.11, at 385 (1975)
[hereinafter DOBBS].

68. See id.
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the existence of damages 70
quired. 69 Provided that the plaintiff proves
71
mathematical certitude is not required.
There seems to be no logical reason why this universal damage
principle should be inapplicable in the loss of use context. Accordingly, it has been held that notions of fairness and equity will not
deprive the plaintiff of his remedy when it is clear that he has
suffered damages. 72 Determination of the amount of the damage
award lies within the sound discretion of the trier of fact. 73 If there
is a sufficient quantity of reliable evidence upon which the jury can

make a fair and reasonable determination, the objection of uncertainty should not be available. 74 Accordingly, in the vast majority
of situations in which a plaintiff has lost the use of personal property,
75
courts have allowed recovery of damages for the loss of its use.

69. For example, in Cope v. Vermeer Sales & Serv. of Colo., 650 P.2d 1307
(Colo. App. 1982), the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had negligently maintained the plaintiff's truck; which rendered him unable to carry on his business.
The court stated: "As a general rule a party is entitled to recover those damages
which naturally and probably result from the negligence of another. The principle
of making the injured party whole underlies all negligence cases. Difficulty or
uncertainty in determining the precise amount does not prevent an award of
damages." Id. at 1308-09 (citations omitted).
70. See Nisbet v. Yelnick, 124 I11.App. 3d 466, 476, 464 N.E.2d 781, 784-85,
(1984); see also notes 326-27 for a discussion of proof of loss of use damages.
71. Brown v. Zimbrick Logging, Inc., 541 P.2d 1388, 1391 (Or. 1975). "[Ejxact
mathematical calculation of damages is not a prerequisite to recovery. 'It is sufficient
if, from the proximate estimate of witnesses, a satisfactory conclusion can be
Id. at 1391 (citation omitted).
reached .......
72. Standard Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81 S.C. 181, 62 S.E. 150 (1908).
To refuse compensation on the grounds that there is no market rental value by
which damages may be definitely ascertained "would be unjust and absurd." Id.
at 181, 62 S.E. at 151.
73. Johnson v. Flammia, 169 Conn. 491, 496, 363 A.2d 1048, 1053 (1975).
74. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dercach, 450 N.E.2d 537, 541 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983).
75. An analogous situation to traditional loss of use cases occurs when an owner
suffers the loss of use of agricultural crops. Although, in such a case, plaintiffs
are not seeking to recover "lost rental value of the chattel" but the value of a
commercial asset. Courts consistently deny an owner recovery for "loss of use"
on the grounds that such an award would be speculative. See, e.g., Gila Water
Co. v. Gila Land & Cattle Co., 28 Ariz. 531, 238 P. 336 (1925); Jay Clutter
Custom Digging v. English, 181 Ind. App. 603, 393 N.E.2d 230 (1979); Nizzi v.
Laverty Sprayers, Inc., 259 Iowa 112, 143 N.W.2d 312 (1966). Because of the
vagaries which are peculiar to raising crops, i.e., floods, drought, pestilence and
the vicissitudes of the marketplace, customary loss of use damages are deemed
inappropriate in these cases. Plaintiffs, however, are not left wholly uncompensated.
Rather than allowing recovery of the value of the crops, courts award the rental
value of the land upon which the plaintiff planted or planned to plant. See Gila,
28 Ariz. at 532, 238 P. at 337; Gregory, 239 Ark. at 418, 389 S.W.2d at 895;
Jay Clutter, 181 Ind. App. at 606, 393 N.E.2d at 234; Nizzi, 259 Iowa at 115,
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Pecuniary Loss Required

Other courts, while stopping short of placing a blanket prohibition
on loss of use damages, require the injured party to sustain the burden

of proving actual pecuniary loss as a prerequisite to recovery. 76
"Actual pecuniary loss" in effect means loss in a "commercial

sense." ' 77 The underpinning of this theory is that the award of such

damages would reward, rather than compensate, the injured party,78
resulting in a windfall7 9 to the plaintiff, particularly when the injured

party had a spare chattel on hand.

0

The import of this argument

is that when a plaintiff recovers damages for the physical injury to
his chattel, the award necessarily takes into account the fact that

repairs cannot be made immediately." Thus, the argument runs, to
award damages for loss of use would result in a double recovery. 2
These courts, relying on the fact that the owner has no right to be
placed in a better position than he would have been in had the
wrong not occurred at all, therefore refuse to award loss of use
damages'. 83
The argument that the plaintiff would be put in a better position
if he were awarded loss of use damages while his chattel is undergoing
repairs has been criticized as conceptually flawed and unrealistic. 4
143 N.W.2d at 317. This remedy provides little solace to the farmer who expected
large profits on his crop in an area where rental value of land is likely to be
moderately low.
76. See, e.g., CTI Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters, 735 F.2d 679 (2d Cir.
1984) (CTI decision is analyzed infra notes 389-95 and accompanying text).
77. The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 133 (1897).
78. See Mountain View I, 99 Misc. 2d 271, 272, 415 N.Y.S.2d 918, 918 (Greene
County Ct. 1978) ("Damages are to restore injured parties, not to reward them")
79. See Young v. Servair, Inc., 33 Mich. App. at 645, 190 N.W.2d at 317. In
Young, the court held that a plaintiff is only entitled to the fair rental value of
a substitute actually rented, absent proof of an attempt to rent and inability to
do so. Allowing recovery for an airplane not actually rented would be a windfall.
Id., 190 N.W.2d at 317.
80. Mountain View I, 99 Misc. 2d at 272, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 918. "Plaintiff
would not be made whole by recovering loss of use but would be paid for the
use of a bus that would otherwise have stood idle. Surely the law requires'every
citizen to minimize damages and this case is no exception." Id.
81. DOBBS, supra note 67, § 5.11, at 383.
82. Id.
83. Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211, 2i7 (1873).
84. As one commentator has noted:
But, of course, this argument has very little to do with the realities that
face a man who must 'get to work in the morning. And since real and
not merely theoretical compensation is the policy of the law, courts today
generally permit a loss of use recovery in appropriate cases, in addition,
of course, to the depreciation or repair costs of the chattel.
DOBBS, supra note 67, § 5.11, at 383.
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Adherence to such a standard fails to recognize that ownership of
a chattel carries with it the right to use or control the use of that
chattel." When an owner has been deprived of such use, he has
lost a valuable interest in the property itself.16 Failure to compensate
7
the plaintiff for such loss leaves him with an inadequate remedy.1
Thus, failure to prove pecuniary loss in a commercial sense should
not necessarily bar recovery for loss of use damagesa The loss
itself should be compensable. 9 It has been held that such recovery
should not be contingent upon whether the owner actually obtains

85. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 152 (1965); see also Note, Damages: Objective

Determination of The Value of The Use of a Chattel, 39 HARV. L. REV. 760
(1926) [hereinafter Value of Use], wherein the author stated:
The theory of compensation for the objective value of the plaintiff's
right of use, which is followed by most American authorities, seems to
be the sounder. The value of the chattel lies in the value of the rights
incident to its ownership. Thus an owner who is deprived of the use of
his [chattel] has had taken from him one of such rights, and should
recover the objective value of this right. The liability of the wrong-doer
results from his putting it out of the power of the owner to use his
[chattel] as he sees fit, and the fact that the owner would not actually
have used it does not affect the value.
Id. at 761; see also KLM, 610 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1979). The court in KLM stated:
The theory behind the allowance of damages for loss of use is that it
is not the actual use but the right to use that is compensable .

. .

. It

is no answer then to say to the victim of the tort: since you have failed
to prove that you would have made a net profit from use of the damaged
property, you may take nothing. For it is the right to use that marks
the value.
Id. at 1056 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also J.A. Tobin Constr.
Co. v. Holtzman, 207 Kan. 525, 531, 485 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1971); Anderson v.
Rexroad, 180 Kan. 505, 513, 306 P.2d 137, 144 (1957); Riddle v. Dean Mach.
Co., 564 S.W.2d 238, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Schmeet v. Schumacher, 137 N.W.2d
789, 791 (N.D. 1965); Perry v. Harris, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 216, 218, 197 N.E.2d 416,
419 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1964).
86. Tobin Constr., 207 Kan. at 531, 485 P.2d at 1281. Ownership of an item
of property carries with it the right to use, or to control the use of that item of
property. If one is deprived of that use he has lost a valuable item of propertythe right to use. Id.
87.
[W]here the defendant tortiously injur[es], destroys, or takes an item of
property, there has been a loss of one of the valuable rights or interests
in property-the right to use the property. Awarding plaintiff only the
cost of repair or the decrease in market value fails to recognize that he
has lost the use of the property item during the time reasonably needed
to repair or replace it.
22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 152 (1965).
88. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 287 U.S. 170, 175 (1932).
This case involved the loss of use of a vessel, and is discussed in greater detail,
infra notes 125-44 and accompanying text.
89. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1056.
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a substitute, because it is the deprivation of enjoyment that alone
justifies compensation. 90 The mere fortuitous circumstance that the
injured party has had the foresight to have a spare on hand for
just such an occasion should not preclude recovery. 91 Awarding the

plaintiff only the cost of repair or the decreased value of the chattel

92
fails to compensate the plaintiff during the period of deprivation.
Of course, although this principle appears sound in a philosophical
sense, it may, as a practical matter, be difficult to apply. 93 Some

rational basis must underlie the determination, in real dollar terms,
of the actual pecuniary loss. 94 For example, when a defendant wrongfully detained a plaintiff's construction equipment, one court held

that the plaintiff could recover for loss of use of that equipment
only if he presented evidence that he was in a position to use it in
fact, not merely that he had a "right to its use." 95
90. See, e.g., Hansen v. Costello, 125 Conn. 386, 388, 5 A.2d 880, 881 (1939);
NorthAmerican Van Lines, Inc. v. Roper, 429 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); A. Mortellaro & Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 91 Fla. 230, 232,
107 So. 528, 529 (1926); Alonso v. Fernandez, 379 So. 2d 685, 687 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980); Globe Motors, Inc. v. Noonan, 106 Ga. App. 486, 490, 127 S.E.2d
320, 324 (1962); McCoy v.Fleming, 153 Kan. 780, 783, 113 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1941);
Pelican Trucking Co. v. Rossetti, 251 Miss. 37, 43, 167 So. 2d 924, 925 (1964);
Naughton Mulgrew Co. v. Westchester Fish Co., 105 Misc. 595, 599, 173 N.Y.S.
437, 439 (1st Dep't 1918); Murphy v. New York City R.R., 58 Misc. 237, 239,
108 N.Y.S. 1021, 1023 (Supp. Ct. App. T. 1908) (Bischoff, J., concurring); Central
Greyhound Lines v. Bonded Freightways, 193 Misc. 320, 323, 82 N.Y.S.2d 671,
673 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1948); Pittari v. Madison Ave. Coach Co., 188
Misc. 614, 616, 68 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1947); Perry v. Harris,
31 Ohio Op. 2d 216, 218, 197 N.E.2d 416, 419 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1964);
Graf v. Don Rasmussen Co., 39 Or. App. 311, 317, 592 P.2d 250, 254 (1979).
91. See Brooklyn Eastern, 287 U.S. at 176-77 (result same whether spare acquired
before event or after); accord Mountain View III, 102 A.D.2d at 665, 476 N.Y.S.2d
at 920 (no reason to draw distinction between cases in which substitute isactually
hired and those in which plaintiff uses spare); cf. Wheeler v. Chadwell, 343 S.W.2d
825, 827 (Ky. 1961) (loss of use allowed over defendant's objections that plaintiff
had spare on hand and no substitute needed). See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "spare boat" doctrine.
92. 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 152 (1965).
93. Jarrett v. E.L. Harper & Son, Inc., 160 W. Va. 399, 403-04, 235 S.E.2d
362, 366 (1977) (Neely, J., concurring).

94. See id.
95. See Korb v. Schroedel, 93 Wis. 2d 207, 212, 286 N.W.2d 589, 592 (1980).
This rule is also stated in texts discussing the remedy of replevin: "The party
claiming the use must show that he was in a position to use it, and that he had
a right to use it, and would have used it if not interfered with by the unlawful
taking." J. COBBEY, THE LAW OF REPLEVIN § 897, at 478 (2d ed. 1900). "This
rule, allowing the value of the use . . . only applies in cases where the party
claiming the use is in a situation to use it, and has a right to use it, and only
applies to cases where the property can be put to use." T. WELLS, THE LAW OF
REPLEVIN § 580, at 492-93 (2d ed. 1907) (citation omitted).
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Insurance and Operational Costs

At least one court has argued that the award of loss of use
96
damages would have a detrimental impact upon both insurance costs
and operating expenses of motor vehicles. 97 Courts have relied on
the burden these increased costs would pose as a rationale for denying
recovery for loss of use damages. 98 Although the escalation of insurance rates and operational costs is a matter of universal concern, 99
denial on these grounds is contrary to basic principles of tort law.' °°
Given a choice between a culpable party and an innocent party, the
wrongdoer should bear the burden. 0 1 Furthermore, it is a basic tenet
of the law of torts that no injury will be denied compensation. 02
4. Litigation Expenses
Opponents of loss of use damages have also argued that the time
and effort required to arrive at an approximation of loss of use
damages unnecessarily increases litigation expenses. In lieu of litigating the loss of use issue, it has been suggested that courts should
use the interest on the value of the chattel as the proper measure
of damages in loss of use cases. 03 This method has the advantage
of being the simplest and least expensive to prove.'04 The interest
rate could be based on either an established index or the legal state
rate for prejudgment interest. 05 Although the plaintiff would still
have to prove the value of the chattel at the time of the injury
with reasonable certainty, °6 this approach would avoid the difficult

96.
97.
98.
99.

See Mountain View I, 99 Misc. 2d at 272, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
See id.
Id.
See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); S. KIMBALL,

AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SYSTEMS-OBJECTIVES AND PERSPECTIVES, CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE (1983).

100. Cope v. Vermeer Sales & Serv. of Colo., 650 P.2d 1307, 1308 (1982). "As
a general rule a party is entitled to recover for those damages which naturally and
probably result from the negligence of another. The principle of making the injured
party whole underlies all negligence cases." Id. (citation omitted).
101. LilIjengren Furniture & Lumber Co. v. Mead, 42 Minn. 420, 422, 44 N.W. 306,
307 (1890) (plaintiff may recover for all injuries so long as they are direct, necessary
and natural effects of the other's actions).
102. Knapp v. Styer, 280 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1960) (measure of damages is amount
which will compensate for all detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it
could have been anticipated or not).
103. Brownstein, supra note 12, at 531-34.
104. Id.at 531.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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problems of determining: (1) the reasonableness of time to repair
or replace; 107 (2) the extent to which the owner would have used
l9
the chattel; 08 (3) in commercial cases, the estimation of lost profits; 1
and (4) the question of whether the substitute actually rented was
of approximately similar quality and performance."l 0
Although loss of use damages have been characterized as "abstract," ' courts have, nonetheless, consistently found judicially acceptable means for awarding such damages. 2 While it is true that
4
the right of use" 3 may be difficult to quantify with precision," it
is equally true that there "would be very few cases where the interest
*.'.."I"1 An
would give the/owner a fair or adequate indemnity .
owner should not be denied complete compensation"' 6 merely for
reasons of simplicity and decreased litigation expenses.
B.

17
Admiralty Law"

While it is true that admiralty generally draws its damage remedies
from the common law," 8 state courts reversed this process by turning
to early British and American admiralty opinions"19 to resolve early
automobile loss of use cases. 20 Accordingly, an understanding of
the principles underlying those decisions is important to comprehend
the current state of the law of loss of use damages.

107. Id. at 532.
108. Id. at 534.
109. Id. at 533.

110. Id. at 532.
111. AT&T v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 470 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D. Conn.
1979).
112. Id. at 108.

113. See supra note 85.
114. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
115. Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562, 566 (1873).
116. Id.
117. See Brownstein, supra note 12, at 483-99; Admiralty Cases, supra note 62,
for discussions of loss of use of maritime vessels. The latter article asserts that the
refusal to award loss of use damages in admiralty cases is an archaic view and should,
accordingly, be discarded. See id. at 313.
118. Admiralty Cases, supra note 62, at 311.
119. Brownstein, supra note 12, at 483. See, e.g., The Umbria, 166 U.S. 404
(1897); The Potomac, 105 U.S. 630 (1882); The Baltimore, 75 U.S. 377 (1869);
The Redwood, 81 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1936); The Hamilton, 95 F. 844 (E.D.N.Y.
1899); The Mediana, 1900 A.C. 113; The Greta Holme, 1897 A.C. 596; The City
of Peking, 15 App. Cas. 438 (P.C. 1890); The Black Prince, 167 Eng. Rep. 258
(Adm. 1862).
120. Brownstein, supra note 12, at 496.

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
1.

[Vol. XV

The Conqueror2 '

Admiralty courts have consistently drawn a distinction between
vessels used for commercial purposes 122 and those used strictly for
pleasure2 3 when awarding loss of use damages. They usually deny
recovery in the latter case. 124

The seminal case in the area of loss of use of a pleasure craft
is the Supreme Court decision in The Conqueror.2 5 In The Conqueror, a steam yacht was illegally detained.126 In denying loss of

use damages, the Court noted that the mere fact that the vessel was
27
tortiously detained did not alone entitle the owner to demurrage.'
Loss of use damages were justified only when the owner incurred
some pecuniary loss, not simply inconvenience as a result of his
inability to use the vessel for purposes of pleasure. 28 Rather, there

must be loss of use in a commercial sense

29

to justify recovery.

Applying this standard to a yacht used exclusively for recreational

121. The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110 (1897).
122. See, e.g., O'Brien Bros. v. The Helen B. Moran, 160 F.2d 502, 506 (2d
Cir. 1947).
123. See, e.g., Snavely v. Lang, 592 F.2d 296, 300 (6th Cir. 1979); Oppen v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 1973); Thomson v. United States, 266
F.2d 852, 856 (4th Cir. 1959). These cases all held that loss of use is not a proper
element of damages for pleasure crafts. But see Finkel v. Challenger Marine Corp.,
316 F. Supp. 549 (S.D. Fla. 1970); The Vanadis, 250 F. 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
124. In Oppen, the court stated, "Under federal maritime law loss of use of a
private pleasure boat is not a compensable item of damages." 485 F.2d at 257
(citing The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110 (1897)). The court disagreed with the plaintiff's
contention that the doctrine of The Conqueror prohibiting recovery of loss of use
damages for pleasure vessels was limited by the holding in Brooklyn Eastern. Id.
at 257. The court noted that the Brooklyn Eastern Court's criticism of The Conqueror
holding was merely dictum: "In our view it takes a new and contrary holding of
the Supreme Court before we are relieved of our obligation to follow previous
holdings of that Court." 485 F.2d at 257 n.12. In Finkel, however, the court
stated:
Earlier cases seem to'hold that the owner of a private pleasure yacht is
not entitled to recover for loss of use of the vessel when it is detained
due to the wrongful act of another party [citing The Conqueror]. The
more modern view, however, seems to be that a private pleasure yacht
falls in the same category as any other repairable chattel, such as an
automobile, even though no substitute vessel is chartered to take its place
during the period of detention [citing Brooklyn Eastern].
316 F. Supp. at 555.
125. 166 U.S. 110 (1897).
126. 166 U.S. at 111.
127. Id. at 133. Demurrage is an action for "the loss of profits or of the use
of a vessel pending repairs or other detention, arising from a collision, or other
maritime tort ....

128. Id.at 133.
129. Id.

" Id. at 125.
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249

purposes, 30 courts must deny loss of use damages,' since such a
32
loss does not justify "substantial compensation."'
Despite dictum in a subsequent Supreme Court decision 33 disapproving of the holding in The Conqueror,134 the Court has yet
to overrule that decision and federal courts must still afford it
3
precedential value for loss of use cases in a maritime context. 1
More recent decisions, however, have indicated that a refusal to
grant loss of use damages for non-commercial chattels is a deteriorating doctrine. 3 6 This deterioration has occurred even in recent
decisions applying the "iron-clad" rule 37 of The Conqueror.' One
such decision was Snavely v. Lang. 39 In Snavely, the court was
careful to point out that it did not decide whether such damages
would never be appropriate. 140 The Conqueror,4' however, is still
considered the seminal case on this point, at least insofar as pleasure
vessels are concerned.

2.

42

43
Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal v. United States

A subsequent Supreme Court decision'

seemed to have alleviated

130. Snavely, 592 F.2d at 300.

131. Id. "[Aln award of damage[s] for such a loss opens the courts to imagination
and speculation in evaluation of damages . . .which render too 'highly speculative

and immeasurable' an award for demurrage in the case of a vessel used purely
for recreation." Id. (quoting Thomson v. United States, 266 F.2d 852, 856 (4th
Cir. 1959)).
132. Id. at 299. "The loss of one summer season of occasional yachting certainly is
an inconvenience, but cannot be considered a deprivation sufficient to justify a
substantial award of damages." Id. at 299.
133. Brooklyn Eastern, 287 U.S. 170, 174-76 (1932).
134.

The Conqueror has been interpreted as creating an iron clad rule that under
federal maritime law demurrage is not an allowable item of damage for
loss of use of a private pleasure craft .... [Even in light of Brooklyn
Eastern Terminal] the court is constrained to view The Conqueror as re-

tainiig its full vitality.
Snavely v. Lang, 592 F.2d 296, 298-99 (6th Cir. 1979).
135. Id. at 299.
136. See infra notes 207-29 and accompanying text.
137. Snavely v. Lang, 592 F.2d at 298.
138. 166 U.S. 110 (1897).
139. Snavely, 592 F.2d at 296.

140. Id. at 300. In a caveat to its opinion the court stated, "[tihe Court does
not herein decide whether pecuniary loss is an absolute requirement for recovery
of demurrage. The facts of this case, showing loss of intermittent use of a vessel
utilized solely for pleasure, certainly do not justify such an award." Id.
141. 166 U.S. 110 (1897).
142. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
143. 287 U.S. 170 (1932).
144. Id.
145. 166 U.S. 110 (1897).
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some of the strictures The Conqueror had placed on recovery for
loss of use of a pleasure vessel.1 45 In Brooklyn Eastern District
Terminal v. United States, 46 the owner of three tugboats lost the
use of one of his boats in a collision. 147 Rather than replacing the

boat, however, the owner avoided lost work time by using his other
vessels overtime. 148 Although the Court denied recovery because the
owner had suffered no "real" damages, 49 it noted that courts could
allow recovery for loss of use of a commercial vessel regardless of
whether the plaintiff had incurred the cost of acquiring a replacement, "10 as long as the damages were actual and the measurement

of damages was based in reality.' 5 ' The Court recognized that the
fair market value of hiring a substitute was a proper "element of
damages resulting from a collision, whether such substitute was
actually procured or not, where a vessel has been employed in a

business of such a nature that for the avoidance of loss there is
need to employ a substitute."' 5 2 The Court also implied that it was
relaxing the prohibitive standards that The Conqueror'53 had imposed
in cases involving pleasure vessels. The Court stated that courts may

award loss of use damages even if the vessel were a yacht employed
solely for pleasure, when a substantial impairment of the enjoyment

of the vessel had occurred. 5 4 This finding by the Court would seem
to resolve the issue in favor of recovery of loss of use for a pleasure
Nevertheless, the Court declined to overrule The Conqueror explicitly.",
As a result, a conflict' 5 6 as well as uncertainty remains today,
146. 287 U.S. 170 (1932).
147. Id.at 173.
148. Id.
149. Id.at 174.
150. Id. at 175
151. Id. at 175-76.
152. Annotation, Cost of Hire of Substitute During Period Disabled Vessel Was
Out of Service as an Element of Damages Recoverable for Collision, 77 L. Ed.
244, 249 (1932).
153. 166 U.S. 110 (1897).
154. 287 U.S. at 175.
155. In reaching its decision in Brooklyn Eastern, the Court noted that its decision
might be in conflict with The Conqueror, but it was not necessary to resolve that
conflict in reaching its decision in the instant case. 287 U.S. at 175. The Court
stated: "There are statements in The Conqueror that may be in conflict with [this]
view, [allowing loss of use damages for pleasure vessels] but they ... are unquestionably in opposition to a strong current of authority." Id. The Court
interpreted The Conqueror as holding only that there could be no recovery for
the loss of use of a pleasure vessel if such recovery was based on imaginary rental.

Id.
156. The Snavely court followed The Conqueror rather than Brooklyn Eastern
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over which standard the courts should apply: the standard of The
Conqueror or that of Brooklyn Eastern.'57 Commentators have criticized the Brooklyn Eastern decision for its failure to overrule
The Conqueror explicitly. ' This criticism is well deserved in that
the Brooklyn Eastern Court noted that the holding of The Conqueror
was in conflict with the strong current of authority. 15 9 Neveitheless,

The Conqueror still mandates refusal of loss of use damages for a
pleasure vessel. 160
3.

The Spare-Boat Doctrine

The "spare-boat" doctrine 161 arises in cases in which an owner
of vessels keeps a substitute vessel available specifically to meet the
contingency of an accident that damages one of his vessels. In such
a case, the courts are willing to consider the value of the use of
the damaged vessel as an element of loss of use damages. 162 It seems
anomolous that the owner who had not been so prepared would be
allowed to recover loss of use but a diligent owner would be left
without an equivalent remedy.163 The Court noted that it should
make no difference that the owner obtained the substitute before
the injury rather than after. 164 The applicability of the doctrine is

limited, however, to situations in which the owner maintains the
"spare" solely for emergencies, and not to substitutes that are used
165
in the general operations of the business.
in reaching its decision. "While appreciative of the reasoning in Brooklyn Eastern
District Terminal ....

the Court is constrained to view The Conqueror as retaining

its full vitality." 592 F.2d at 299. Though the Snavely court's opinion was faithful
to the holding of The Conqueror it ignored the explicit disapproval in Brooklyn
Eastern of the inflexible refusal of loss of use damages for pleasure vessels. ld.
at 298-99.
157. See id. (court attempts to weigh merits of two views).
158. See MCCoRMIcK, supra note 19, § 124, at 475 (1935); see also Value of
Use, supra note 19, at 760-62.
159. See supra note 155.
160. See Snavely v. Lang, 592 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1979).
161. 287 U.S. at 176-77. The doctrine of the "spare boat" applies as follows:
Ship owners at times maintain an extra or spare boat which is kept in
reserve for the purpose of being utilized as a substitute in the contingency
of damage to other vessels of the fleet ...

[In such conditions the

value of the use of a boat thus specially reserved may be part of the
demurrage.
Id.
162. Id.

163. Id. at 177. "If no such boat had been maintained, another might have
been hired, and the hire charged as an expense." Id.
164. Id.

165. Id.
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Totally Destroyed Vessels

Although admiralty law served as the impetus for the early development of the loss of use doctrine, 66 in cases involving total
destruction of the chattel admiralty law has lagged behind most state
courts.

67

The rationale of these admiralty decisions sheds light on

why state courts initially denied recovery for loss of use damages
in non-admiralty cases involving totally destroyed chattels.
Courts traditionally advanced four reasons as justification for
16
8
denial of loss of use damages when a vessel was totally destroyed.
First, such damages were deemed to be speculative.' 69 Second, such
vessels were, allegedly, easily replaced.' 70 Third, recovery of full
value plus interest was seen as full compensation, and loss of use
would thus be a windfall. 7 ' Finally, denial of loss of use damages
72
was thought to encourage mitigation of damages.
166. See supra note 119.
167. See infra notes 184-209 and accompanying text.
168. See Admiralty Cases, supra note 62, at 314-15.
169. In The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 (1818), the Court reasoned as follows:
The probable or possible benefits of a voyage ... can never afford a

safe rule by which to estimate damages in cases of a marine trespass.
There is so much uncertainty in the rule itself, so many contingencies
which may vary or extinguish its application, and so many difficulties
in sustaining its legal correctness, that the court cannot believe it proper
to entertain it.

Id. at 560.
170. In The Hamilton, 95 F. 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1899), the court stated, "the market
abounds in ships awaiting purchase, so that ...

the [plaintiffs] may at once substitute

a new ship for the one lost." Id. at 845. While this may have been the case in
1899, it is unrealistic in modern society. To replace a vessel, particularly a large
commercial one, requires a tremendous amount of capital and, most likely, a good
deal of time. Delay problems may be further exacerbated by the time required for
insurance claims to be investigated and the proceeds forwarded, without which it
would be economically unfeasible for the owner to replace the destroyed vessel. It
seems inequitable that the owner should have to bear this entire burden.
171. See The Hygrade No. 24 v. The Dynamic, 233 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1956);
The Hamilton, 95 F. 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1899); State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284 (Alaska
1973).
172. For example, in The Umbria, 166 U.S. 404 (1897), the Court stated:
In cases of partial loss there is no injustice in allowing the probable
profits of a charter for the short time during which the vessel is laid
up for repairs, but in cases of a total loss the recovery of such profits
is limited to the voyage which the vessel is then performing, since, if
the owner were entitled to recover the profits of a future voyage or
charter, there would seem to be no limit to such right so far as respects
the time of its continuance; and if the vessel were under a charter which
had months or years to run, the allowance of the probable profits of
such charter might work a great practical injustice to the owner of the
vessel causing the injury.

1986-87]

LOSS OF USE DAMAGES

Today, however, admiralty law may finally be willing to award
loss of use damages for a totally destroyed vessel 171 in appropriate
circumstances. 174 In Barger v. Hanson, the owner's fishing vessel
75
was completely destroyed in a collision with the defendant's vessel.
The court allowed recovery for one month's lost use, 76 contrary to
traditional admiralty law. The court emphasized that it would not
reach the question of whether loss of use was a proper element of
damages for destroyed vessels. 77 After asserting several justifications,
however, the court in fact allowed recovery for the lost use. 78 The
court justified its result by noting that: (1) the parties had stipulated
to the amount of damages and thus had avoided speculation prob-

lems; (2) the vessel was not easily replaced; (3) no interest was
awarded, so that the double recovery problem would not arise; and
(4) the plaintiff had made diligent efforts to replace the vessel in
79

an attempt to mitigate damages.1
The guidelines set up by the Barger court present a possibly viable
alternative to the Court's absolute refusal under the traditional rule
to award loss of use damages whenever a vessel is totally destroyed.
Commentators have argued that the Barger decision is the proper

application of the loss of use doctrine for a destroyed vessel. 80 The
primary advantage of the analysis lies in the fact that the plaintiff
receives full compensation and the defendant is liable for only those
injuries proximately caused by his actions.' 8 ' Nevertheless, most
admiralty cases continue to follow the old rule, 8 2 and still deny
recovery for loss of use when a vessel has been destroyed.
Id. at 422. This reasoning has been criticized for "presuppos[ing] that the injured
party is not required to make diligent efforts to replace or rent a substitute for
his lost vessel." Admiralty Cases, supra note 62, at 315.
173. See Admiralty Cases, supra note 62, at 323-28.
174. Barger v. Hanson, 426 F.2d 640, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1970).
175. Id. at 642.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.at 643.
179. Id.at 642-43.
180. See Admiralty Cases, supra note 62, at 325.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., King Fisher Marine Serv. v. The NP Sunbonnet, 724 F.2d 1181,
1185 (5th Cir. 1984) (replacement cost awarded); A&S Transp. Co. v. The Tug
Fajardo, 688 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1982) (measure of damages for totally destroyed
vessel is value at time of loss plus interest, loss of use not allowable); Alkmeon
Naviera S.A. v. M/V Marina L., 633 F.2d 789, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1980) (present
market value awarded); O'Brien Bros. v. The Helen B. Moran, 160 F.2d 502, 506
(2d Cir. 1947) (no loss of use awarded for totally destroyed vessel); The President
Madison, 91 F.2d 835, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1937) (value is measure of damages in
case of total loss); The Redwood, 81 F.2d 680, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1936) (same).
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The Total Destruction-Partial Destruction Paradox

The concerns expressed in admiralty cases that denied recovery
for a totally destroyed vessel'83 carried over into early common law
cases which similarly denied recovery for a totally destroyed chattel. 18 4
Some jurisdictions continue to adhere to this antiquated doctrine.' 85
183. See supra notes 117-81 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Fort Pitt Gas Co. v. Evansville Contract Co., 123 F. 63 (3d Cir.
1903) (measure of damages for negligent destruction of boat is its value, and owner
is not entitled in addition to recover value of its use during such time as would
be required to rebuild it); Hunt v. Ward, 262 Ala. 379, 385, 79 So. 2d 20, 26
(1955) (if owner of damaged truck abandons it and buys another for his own use,
he has thereby mitigated his damages and may only recover amount of depreciation
in value of damaged truck); Fuller v. Martin, 41 Ala. App. 160, 164, 125 So. 2d
4, 8 (1960) (recovery cannot be had for both total loss of automobile and loss of
use of same vehicle); Morgan Millwork Co. v. Dover Garage Co., 30 Del. 383,
388, 108 A. 62, 64 (1919) (recovery is limited to difference in value of chattel
before and after injury); Skaggs Drug Centers v. Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 10, 407
P.2d 695, 699 (1965) (value of chattel at time and place of destruction); Kohl v.
Arp, 236 Iowa 31, 33, 17 N.W.2d 824, 826 (1945) (in case of total destruction,
measure of damages is reasonable market value of automobile before its destruction,
damages for loss of use are not allowed); Goutierrez v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107
So. 2d 847, 852 (La. Ct. App. 1959) (no recovery allowed for loss of use damages
when vehicle has been totally destroyed); McLaughlin v. City of Bangor, 58 Me.
398, 400 (1870) ("If the article was wholly destroyed, we presume no one would
think of claiming damages for loss of use of it, in addition to its full value.");
Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md. 676, 684-85, 217 A.2d 525, 530 (1966) (market
value at time and place of destruction); Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 388, 279
N.W. 227, 237 (1938) (income derived from chattel's use at time of tort); Orr v.
Williams, 379 S.W.2d 181, 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (recovery of full value excludes
recovery of loss of use of chattel); Neil v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369, 373, 122 N.W.2d
65, 68 (1963) (difference in reasonable fair market value before and after accident);
Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211, 217 (1873) (same); Foard v. Atlantic & N.E. Ry.,
53 N.C. 235, 237 (1860) (interest on fair market value of chattel); Hayes Freight
Lines v. Tarver, 148 Ohio St. 82, 83, 73 N.E.2d 192, 193 (1947) (one who recovers
full value of motor vehicle completely destroyed by negligence of another, may
not also recover for loss of use of vehicle); Glass v. Miller, 51 N.E.2d 299, 301
(1940) (same); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Harrell, 66 F. Supp. 559, 561 (W.D.
Okla. 1946) (applying Oklahoma law) (recovery limited to value of property); Cogbill
v. Martin, 308 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957) (when chattel is totally
destroyed, proper measure of damages is difference in market value immediately
before and after injury, and no additional recovery can be had for loss of use of
chattel while it is being replaced); Purington v. Newton, 114 Vt. 490, 494, 49 A.2d
98, 100 (1946) (difference in market value before and after); Averett v. Shircliff,
218 Va. 202, 204, 237 S.E.2d 92, 95-96 (1977) (same); McCurdy v. Union Pacific
R.R., 68 Wash. 2d 457, 469, 413 P.2d 617, 624 (1966) (if car is totally destroyed
plaintiff cannot recover for loss of use because in recovering full value of chattel,
owner has been made whole); Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 497, 164
S.E.2d 710 (1968) (market value of chattel at time of destruction); Wilcox v.
Herbert, 75 Wyo. 289, 300, 295 P.2d 755, 760 (1956) (same).
185. The proposition exists in Alabama, see Fuller v. Martin, 41 Ala. App. 160,
166, 125 So. 2d 4, 7 (1960); Illinois, see Cunningham v. Crane Co., 255 Ill. App.
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Courts denied loss of use for the totally destroyed chattel for
reasons analogous to those relied on in admiralty law. s6 First, courts
were of the opinion that when the owner received the full market
value of the chattel as of the date of its destruction, he had been
made whole." s7 Second, they presumed that the owner had the ability
to enter the market place and purchase a replacement.' 8 Third, most
courts adhered to the view that such damages were too speculative
to make reasonably accurate awards. 8 9 Finally, courts advanced the
theory that once the chattel was destroyed, the owner no longer
had any valuable interest in the property.'19 Thus a distinction was
drawn between the repairable and the irreparable chattel,' 9' a dis373, 374 (1930); Missouri, see Orr v. Williams, 379 S.W.2d 181, 189 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1964); Nebraska, see Neil v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369, 373, 122 N.W.2d 65,
68 (1963); Ohio, see Hayes Freight Lines v. Tarver, 148 Ohio St. 82, 83, 73 N.E.2d
192, 193 (1947) (compare Tri-State v. Geupel, No. 84B-337, slip op. at 4 (Ohio
Ct. App. Aug. 15, 19,85) (wherein Ohio's continued adherence to the total/partial
distinction was criticized by Ohio Court of Appeals)); Texas, see Cogbill v. Martin,
308 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Washington, see McCurdy v. Union
Pacific R.R., 63 Wash. 457, 467, 413 P.2d 617, 623 (1966).
186. See infra notes 107-82 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Hayes Freight Lines v. Tarver, 148 Ohio St. 82, 83, 73 N.E.2d
192, 193 (1947) (damages for rental value in addition to cost of repair would place
plaintiff in better position than before the injury); Kintner v. Claverack Rural Elec.
Coop. Inc., 329 Pa. Super. 417, 424, 478 A.2d 858, 861 (1984) ("rule denying
recovery [for total destruction] seems to be based on the idea that the plaintiff
has been made whole upon receiving the full market value of the property as of
the date of destruction and has the presumed ability to enter the marketplace and
purchase a replacement").
188. See Kintner, 329 Pa. Super. at 424, 478 A.2d at 861 (citing Allanson v.
Cummings, 81 A.D.2d 16, 18-19, 439 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547 (4th Dep't 1981)).
189. See Stephens v. Foster, 46 Ariz. 391, 398, 51 P.2d 248, 251 (1935); Hunter
v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 30, 168 P. 918, 919 (1917); Louisville & I. R.R. v.
Schuester, 183 Ky. 504, 507, 209 S.W. 542, 545 (1919); McLaughlin v. City of
Bangor, 58 Me. 398, 400 (1870). See notes 49-60 and accompanying text for a
general discussion on the speculative nature of loss of use damages.
190. Madison-Smith Cadillac Co. v. Wallace, 181 Ark. 715, 717, 27 S.W.2d 524,
525 (1930) (car had no usable value when being repaired; therefore, correct measure
of damages was difference in value before and after accident), overruled, Sharp
v. Great Southern Coaches, Inc., 256 Ark. 773, 510 S.W.2d 266 (1974).
In Fort Pitt Gas Co. v. Evansville Contract Co., 123 F. 63 (3d Cir. 1903), the
court reasoned as follows: the award of loss of use damages for the total destruction
of a chattel would amount to the "award of two-fold compensation for the same
loss. The right to use [the chattel] was incident to its ownership, and therefore
compensation for its destruction, which of course extinguished the ownership, would
necessarily be compensative of the consequent deprivation of its use." Id. at 64
(emphasis added).
191. In Johnson v. Scott, 258 Iowa 1267, 142 N.W.2d 460 (1966), the court set
out three accepted methods for the determination of damages to a motor vehicle:
1. When the automobile is totally destroyed, the measure of damages is
its reasonable market value immediately before its destruction.
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tinction that is difficult to explain.192 Commentators have hypothesized that the distinction is an anachronistic carryover from the
common law action of trover1 93 and have criticized it as a doctrine
no longer in harmony with modern principles of jurisprudence. 194
Accordingly, the modern trend has been toward eliminating this
archaic distinction. 195 The approach of the majority of modern
2. Where the injury to the car can be repaired, so that, when repaired,
it will be in as good condition as it was before the injury, then the
measure of damages is the reasonable cost of repair plus the reasonable
value of use of the car while being repaired with ordinary diligence not
exceeding the value of the car before the injury.
3. When the car cannot by repair be placed in as good condition as it
was in before the injury, then the measure of damages is the difference
between its reasonable market value immediately before, and immediately
after the accident.
Id. at 1270, 142 N.W.2d at 462 (citation omitted). The distinctions drawn by the
court seem highly arbitrary. For example, even if one supports the proposition
that an award of loss of use damages should be denied when the chattel has been
totally destroyed, it seems anomalous to award such damages for a vehicle which
can be returned to its pre-accident condition and deny recovery for a car which
cannot be restored to as good condition as before the accident. To adhere to this
view affords the more seriously injured plaintiff an inferior remedy than is available
to his less seriously injured counterpart.
192. 22 AM. JUR. Damages § 153 (1965).
193. Allanson v. Cummings, 81 A.D.2d 16, 18-20, 439 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546-47
(4th Dep't 1981). In an action for trover, the owner abandons his property and
pursues the value of the property in lieu thereof. The measure of damages is the
value at the time of conversion and interest thereon until the time of trial, and
"it would have to be a very special case that would authorize greater damages."
Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. at 563 (1873).
194.
[T]he owner of a totally destroyed vehicle suffers not only its destruction
but also the loss of use of his property for such time as a replacement
vehicle is unobtainable. It is that deprivation of use for which a plaintiff
is entitled to recover reasonable damages, until he can obtain a
replacement-since the loss of use is a detriment proximately caused by
the wrongful destruction of his property ....

The general rule regarding

damages occasioned by the total destruction of one's motor vehicle has
long been limited to recovery simply for the vehicle's value at the time
of its destruction. The reason for this rule is not clear. It may be based
upon the historical limitation contained in an action for trover at common
law.
81 A.D.2d at 18-20, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 546-47 (citations omitted).
195. See, e.g., Knapp v. Styer, 280 F.2d 384, 390 (8th Cir. 1960) (plaintiff may
recover for loss of use for time necessarily consumed in repairing damage caused
by collision, or if any part of unit was beyond repair, for time necessarily required
to obtain adequate replacement); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Elk Refining Co.,
186 F.2d 30, 32-33 (4th Cir. 1950) (rental value reasonably and necessarily paid
for use of other property to take place of that which has been damaged, until it
can be repaired or replaced, constitutes fair measure of damages); Guido v. Hudson
Transit Lines, 178 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1950) (when personal property is taken
or injured special damages necessarily and proximately attendant upon such loss
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cases 196 in which a chattel is completely destroyed may be stated
as follows. The plaintiff must first prove that despite his good faith

efforts, he was unable to acquire a replacement vehicle within a
reasonable period of time. 197 Upon such proof, the plaintiff may
then recover damages for the loss of use of the destroyed chattel, 9 s
which is usually the reasonable rental value of a substitute during

may be proven to augment damages beyond mere value of property lost); Stevens
v. Mid-Continent Invs., Inc., 257 Ark. 439, 441, 517 S.W.2d 208, 209 (1974)
(lost profits during time reasonably necessary to replace); Reynolds v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 53 Cal. 2d 49, 50, 345 P.2d 926, 927 (1959)
(rental value and lost income during time reasonably necessary to replace); Teitsworth
v. Kempski, 50 Del. 234, 239, 127 A.2d 237, 239 (1956) (when automobile is so
damaged that it cannot possibly be returned to same value as before injury, plaintiff
may recover full value of chattel plus loss of use during period necessary to replace);
Gamble v. Smith, 386 A.2d 692, 695 (D.C. 1-978) (same); New York Cent. R.R.
v. Churchill, 140 Ind. App. 426, 431, 218 N.E.2d 372, 376 (1966) (same); Long
v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256, 259 (1982) (loss of use damages will be incurred
just as readily when chattel is totally destroyed as when it can be repaired); J.A.
Tobin Constr. Co. v. Holtzman, 207 Kan. 525, 532, 485 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1971)
(same); Terrebone v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 64 So. 2d 868, 872 (La. Ct.
App. 1953) (plaintiff using car in business may recover loss of use damages for
short period of time necessary to make arrangements to replace totally destroyed
vehicle); Fred Frederick Motors, Inc. v. Krause, 12 Md. App. 62, 67, 277 A.2d
464, 467 (1971) (recovery for loss of use may be made in appropriate cases even
where there is also recovery for full value of vehicle); Sharton v. Westerbeke Corp.,
11 Mass. App. 925, 926, 415 N.E.2d 880, 882 (1981) (recovery of loss of use
allowed for totally destroyed sailboat); Bos v. Dolajak, 167 Mont. 1, 10, 534 P.2d
1258, 1262 (1975) (replacement costs plus loss of use of silo awarded); Bartlett v.
Garrett, 130 N.J. Super. 193, 196, 325 A.2d 866, 867 (Cumberland County Ct.
1974) (rental value of substitute where damage to chattel is partial or total); Central
Greyhound Lines v. Bonded Freightways, 193 Misc. 320, 323, 82 N.Y.S.2d 671
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1948) (recovery for loss of use regardless of pecuniary

loss); Ling v. Bell, 23 N.C. App. 10, 13, 207 S.E.2d 789, 792 (1974) (awarding
rental value of replacement for interval reasonably necessary for the acquisition of
a substitute vehicle); DTS Tank Serv., Inc. v. Vanderveen, 683 P.2d 1345, 1347
(Okla. 1984) (loss of use allowed for total destruction); Kintner v. Claverack Rural
Elec. Coop., 329 Pa. Super. 417, 424-25, 478 A.2d 858, 862 (1984) (damages for
loss of use of personal property are recoverable whether or not property can be
repaired); Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 353, 241 P.2d 914, 921
(1952) (when property is destroyed, true measure of damages is difference between
market value of that property immediately before destruction and its replacement
cost, plus property's use value until replaced within time required of prudent plaintiff
in exercise of his duty to mitigate damages less any salvage value of destroyed
property); Nashban Barrel & Container Co. v. G.G. Parsons Trucking Co.,* 49
Wis. 2d 591, 601, 182 N.W.2d 448, 453 (1971) ("We conclude that it is correct
to follow the modern view allowing recovery for loss of use in addition to total
damages, even when the vehicle is not repairable").
196. See id.

197. See Allanson, 81 A.D.2d at 21, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
198. See id.
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the time reasonably necessary to obtain a replacement, had one
been available. 99
This approach necessarily raises the question of what is a "reasonable" time for replacement? Is the owner required to make the
effort or should it be sufficient for the owner to prove how long
it would have taken to replace the chattel had the good faith effort
been made? Perhaps a reasonable time span would be the time
period necessary to replace the chattel had the owner made good
faith efforts to replace, provided that the owner suffered pecuniary
loss from the deprivation. If in fact the owner makes a good faith
effort, however, the time necessary to replace the chattel should be
prima facie evidence of reasonableness and the owner should be
entitled to recover for the time reasonably necessary to determine
that the chattel could not be repaired and then to replace the chattel.
There is no practical reason for allowing recovery when loss of
use of the chattel is temporary but denying recovery when the damage
is permanent. 200 It makes little sense to recognize loss of use as an
element of damages on one hand, and then, on the other hand,
deny recovery simply because the chattel has been destroyed. 20 , Loss
of use is a loss different in kind from actual physical injury to the
property itself. 20 2 It is directed at compensating the owner for the
199. See id.
200. Reynolds v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 53 Cal. 2d 49,
50, 345 P.2d 926, 927 (1959).
There appears to be no logical or practical reason why a distinction
should be drawn between cases in which the property is totally destroyed
and those in which it has been injured but is repairable, and we have
concluded that when the owner of a negligently destroyed commercial
vehicle has suffered injury by being deprived of the use of the vehicle
during the period required for replacement, he is entitled, upon proper
pleading and proof, to recover for loss of use in order to "compensate
for all the detriment proximately caused" by the wrongful destruction.
Id. at 50, 345 P.2d at 927 (citation omitted in original). Accord Gamble v. Smith,
386 A.2d 692, 695 (D.C. 1978); New York Cent. R.R. v. Churchill, 140 Ind. App.
426, 430, 218 N.E.2d 372, 376 (1966); Nashban Barrel & Container Co. v. G.G.
Parsons Trucking Co., 49 Wis. 2d 591, 600, 182 N.W.2d 448, 452 (1971).
201. See New York Cent. R.R., 140 Ind. App. at 430, 218 N.E.2d at 376.

We fail to see any valid reason for the distinction between repairable
or irreparable damage which would justify loss of use for the former
and not the latter. In what manner can we justify the recognition of

loss of use as a property right incidental to ownership in one instance
and not the other? Have not both property owners lost the same thing,
i.e., the use of such property? To hold to the contrary would be to
effectuate a legal principle without a valid reason.
Id. at 430, 218 N.E.2d at 376.
202. See Bartlett v. Garrett, 130 N.J. Super. 193, 196, 325 A.2d 866 (Law Div.

1974).
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economic loss he has suffered because of the loss of his property.

°3

Thus, limiting the owner's recovery to actual physical damage leaves

him without adequate compensation.2°4 Furthermore, since the cost
of repairs or replacement of the chattel may not exceed the preaccident value of the chattel, courts should not aggregate the amount
of loss of use damages with the amount awarded for physical injuries

in deciding the ceiling on damages, when the owner has reasonably
undertaken to repair the chattel. °5
The rationale of the modern trend seems more in harmony with
accepted principles of compensation and equity, and is accordingly
the more appropriate measure of damages.; °6
D.

The Commercial-Pleasure Distinction

Some courts have also drawn a distinction between the allowance
of loss of use damages for commercial vehicles 207 and pleasure
vehicles. 20 8 Traditionally, courts have granted recovery for loss of

use of a commercial chattel with greater frequency than recovery
20 9
for loss of use of a chattel used merely for pleasure.

203. See id.
204. Gamble v. Smith, 386 A.2d 692, 695 (D.C. 1978); Long v. McAllister, 319
N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1982).
205. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 125, at 476-77.
It is stated in numerous opinions that, in case of injury, the recovery
for cost of repair and loss of use must not exceed the value of the
property at the time it was injured. The greater includes the less, and
it seems that ordinarily the damages for injury should not exceed those
for destruction. If the repairs have not been made, this rule should hold
good as a limit upon any recovery for the anticipated cost of restoration.
But, where repairs have been prudently undertaken, under circumstances where repair seems the reasonable course, then, if in fact the
cost of repair, including loss of use, exceeds the value of the chattel,
there should be no hard and fast rules fixing that value as the maximum
recovery.

Id.
206. The paradox presented by the older rule is obvious and, to a certain extent,
disturbing. A tortfeasor faced with the prospect of having to pay for repairs to
a chattel as well as damages for loss of use, could put himself in a more favorable
position by totally destroying the chattel in order to limit his liability. This is a
result which the law surely would not hope to encourage. This problem would not
arise if the particular jurisdiction limited a plaintiff's total recovery to the total
value of the vehicle.
207. For the purposes of this Note, the definition of a commercial vehicle is
any vehicle used primarily for business purposes.
208. A pleasure vehicle may be not only a vehicle used for recreational purposes,
but also one used for general, non-business activities. Husebo v. Ambrosia, Ltd.,
204 Neb. 499, 500, 283 N.W.2d 45, 47 (1979).
209. See, e.g., Sharp v. Great Southern Coaches, 256 Ark. 773, 774, 510 S.W.2d
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It is widely accepted 210 in American jurisprudence that an owner
of a commercial chattel is entitled to recover not only for the
necessary repairs 21 to his damaged chattel, but also for the deprivation of its beneficial use 212 during the time necessary to make
266, 267 (1974) (holding that loss of use of damaged commercial motor vehicle is
compensable, and abrogating prior law of Arkansas, which did not allow for
recovery of loss of use-but only insofar as commercial vehicles are concerned).
210. Brandon v. Capital Transit Co., 71 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1950).
211. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1055 (when chattel is damaged, difference in market
value before and after injury is recoverable).
212. See, e.g., Hunt v. Ward, 262 Ala. 379, 385, 79 So. 2d 20, 25-26 (1955);
Williams v. Eckert, 643 P.2d 991, 996 (Alaska 1982); Burgess Constr. Co. v.
Hancock, 514 P.2d 236, 238 (Alaska 1973); Gila Water Co. v. Gila Land & Cattle
Co., 28 Ariz. 531, 534, 238 P. 336, 337 (1925); Stevens v. Mid-Continent Invs.,
Inc., 257 Ark. 439, 441, 517 S.W.2d 208, 209 (1974); Sharp v. Great Southern
Coaches Inc., 256 Ark. 773, 774, 510 S.W.2d 266, 267 (1974); Valencia v. Shell
Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840, 844, 147 P.2d 558, 560 (1948); Cope v. Vermeer Sales
& Serv. Inc., 650 P.2d 1307, 1308 (Colo. App. 1982); Hillman v. Bray Lines, 41
Colo. App. 493, 497, 591 P.2d 1332, 1336 (1978), aff'd, 625 P.2d 364 (Colo.
1981); Power Equip. Co. v. Fulton, 32 Colo. App. 430, 432-33, 513 P.2d 234,
236 (1973); AT&T v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 470 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D.
Conn. 1979) (applying Connecticut law); Eschinger v. United Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
61 A.2d 725, 728 (D.C. 1948); A. Mortellaro & Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,
91 Fla. 230, 232, 107 So. 528, 528-29 (1926); Brown v. South-western R.R., 36
Ga. 377, 379 (1867); National Motor Serv. Co. v. Walters, 85 Idaho 349, 360-61,
379 P.2d 643, 651 (1963); Karlin v. Inland Steel Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d 183, 187,
395 N.E.2d 1038, 1041 (1979); Knaus Truck Lines v. Commercial Freight Lines,
238 Iowa 1356, 1366-67, 29 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1947); New York Cent. R.R. v.
Churchill, 140 Ind. App. 426, 430, 218 N.E.2d 372, 376 (1966); Weddle v. Indiana
R.C. & D. Warehouse Corp., 119 Ind. App. 354, 359, 85 N.E.2d 501, 503 (1949); Nelson v. Hy-Grade Constr. Materials Co., 215 Kan. 631, 635, 527 P.2d 1059, 1062-63
(1974); Wheeler v. Chadwell, 343 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Ky. 1961); Borey v. Manno,
19 La. App. 270, 272, 140 So. 109, 111 (1932); Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md.
676, 684-85, 217 A.2d 525, 530 (1966); Antokol v. Barber, 248 Mass. 393, 396,
143 N.E. 350, 352 (1924); National Steel Corp. v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 574
F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying Michigan law); Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn.
381, 383, 279 N.W. 227, 230-31 (1938); First Nat'l Bank v. Olive, 330 So. 2d 568,
571 (Miss. 1976); Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, 355 Mo. 695, 705, 197 S.W.2d
657, 663 (1946); McPherson v. Kerr, 195 Mont. 454, 459-460, 636 P.2d 852, 856
(1981); Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Omaha
Ry., 147 Neb. 880, 886, 25 N.W.2d 396, 400 (1947); Buckley v. Buckley, 12 Nev.
423, 439 (1877); Rogers v. Nelson, 97 N.H. 72, 75, 80 A.2d 393, 395 (1951);
Interpool, Ltd. v. Universal Maritime Serv., Corp., 1983 A.M.C 1082, 1083 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982); Smith Motor Car Corp. v. Universal Credit Co., 154
Misc. 100, 104, 275 N.Y.S. 538, 543 (1st Dep't 1934); Roberts v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 273 N.C. 600, 606, 160 S.E. 2d 712, 717 (1968); Mahanna v.
Westland Oil Co., 107 N.W.2d 353, 359 (N.D. 1960); Harris v. Keller, 170 N.E.2d
305, 306 (Ohio 1960); Chambers v. Cunningham, 153 Okla. 129, 130, 5 P.2d 378,
379-80 (1931); Shepherd v. Hub Lumber Co., 273 Or. 331, 347, 541 P.2d 439,
446 (1975); Holt v. Pariser, 161 Pa. Super. 315, 319-20, 54 A.2d 89, 91 (1947);
Petroleum Heat & Power Co. v. United Elec. Rys. Co., 150 A. 259, 260-61 (R.I.
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repairs 213 or to replace 21 4 the totally destroyed chattel. The rationale
behind allowing such recovery is that the owner has suffered not
only physical injury215 to his property, but has also been deprived
of the means to generate income.2 1 6 Under these circumstances,
damages are more readily apparent in a pecuniary sense. 2 7 By contrast, loss of a chattel used merely for pleasure does not hinder
profit-making operations.2t 8 It is difficult to deny that an owner
who has been deprived of an integral item of property necessary to
the production of income should be allowed to recover for that
loss. 219 Therefore, it is almost universally accepted 220 that, in addition
to recovery for physical damage to the commercial chattel, the owner
may recover for its loss of use.
Courts can measure the amount of recovery by the value of the

1930); Standard Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81 S.C. 181, 183-84, 62 S.E. 150,
151 (1908); Thormahlen v. Foos, 83 S.D. 558, 564, 163 N.W.2d 350, 353 (1968);
Duling v. Burnett, 22 Tenn. App. 522, 539-40, 124 S.W.2d 294, 305 (1938); Schroeder
Lumber Co. v. U.F. Merritt, 323 S.W.2d 163, 165-66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Park
v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 353, 241 P.2d 914, 921-22 (1952); Wheeler
& Harding v. Townshend, 42 Vt. 15, 16, (1869); Somerville v. Dellosa, 133 W.
Va. 435, 445, 56 S.E.2d 756, 763 (1949); Production Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski,
90 Wis. 2d 344, 356, 280 N.W.2d 118, 124 (1979); Colorado Kenworth, Inc. v.
Archie Meek Trarrsp. Co., 495 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Wyo. 1972).
213. See supra notes 183-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of chattels
that have been damaged but not totally destroyed.
214. See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text for a discussion of chattels
that have been completely destroyed.
215. See Nisbet v. Yelnick, 124 Ill. App. 3d 466, 472, 464 N.E.2d 781, 785
(1984) (damages for cost of correcting defects). See supra note 212 for cases awarding
cost of repairs as well as loss of use damages.
216. Young, Inc. v. Servair, Inc., 33 Mich. App. 643, 645, 190 N.W.2d 316,
317 (1971) (damages caused by inability of plaintiff to use his airplane is compensable).
217. The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 133 (1897).
218. See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
The Conqueror, the seminal Supreme Court decision on the loss of use of a pleasure
craft. See supra notes 206-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the loss
of use of a non-commercial chattel.
219. See supra note 189.
220. A few jurisdictions apparently do not allow recovery for loss of use of a
commercial chattel. See Moll and Reiners-v. Bark "George," & G.B. Post & Co.,
1 Haw. 270, 272 (1856) (interest on value of vessel wrongfully detained plus
compensation for any diminution in value); McLaughlin v. City of Bangor, 58 Me.
398, 400 (1870) (cost of repairs); Fredenburgh v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 79 N.M.
593, 596-97, 446 P.2d 868, 871 (1968) (recovery limited to either difference in
market value before and after damage, or cost of repairs plus any diminution in
value); Averett v. Shircliff, 218 Va. 202, 204, 237 S.E.2d 92, 95-96 (1977) (difference
in market value or cost of repair, whichever is less).
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use of the chattel, 22 1 or the cost of a replacement,2 22 i.e., rental of
a substitute. In cases in which rental value is the accepted measure

221. See, e.g., AT&T Co. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 470 F. Supp.
105, 107 (D. Conn. 1979); National Motor Serv. Co. v. Walters, 85 Idaho 349,
360-61, 379 P.2d 643, 651 (1963); Brown v. Steed, 317 Il. App. 541, 541, 47
N.E.2d 114, 115 (1943); Knaus Truck Lines, Inc. v. Commercial Freight Lines,
238 Iowa 1356, 1366-67, 29 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1947); Weddle v. I.R.C. & D.
Warehouse Corp., 119 Ind. App. 354, 359, 85 N.E.2d 501, 503 (1949) ("loss of
use [is] a proper element of damages . . . the damage is its rental value, if it has
rental value, but, if not, then the value of use to the injured party for the time
he was deprived of its use"); Columbia Gas Inc. v. Maynard, 532 S.W.2d 3, 7
(Ky. 1975) (rental value is relevant factor in determining value of use); Hopper,
McGaw & Co. v. Kelly, 145 Md. 161, 167, 125 A. 779, 780 (1924); National Steel
Corp. v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 574 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying
Michigan law); Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 388, 279 N.W. 227, 230-31 (1938);
Bos v. Dolajak, 167 Mont. 1, 8, 534 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1975); Buckley v. Buckley,
12 Nev. 423, 439 (1877); Paguio v. Evening Journal Ass'n., 127 N.J.L. 144, 145,
21 A.2d 667, 668 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1941); Chambers v. Cunningham, 153 Okla. 129,
130, 5 P.2d 378, 379-80 (1931); Nelson v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 659, 155
S.E.2d 917, 921 (1967); Thormahlen v. Foos, 83 S.D. 558, 564, 163 N.W.2d 350,
353 (1968); Duling v. Burnett, 22 Tenn. App. 522, 539-40, 124 S.W.2d 294, 305
(1938); Bergstrom v. Mellen, 57 Utah 42, 43-44, 192 P. 679, 679 (1920).
222. See, e.g., Wilson & Co. v. Sims, 250 Ala. 414, 415, 34 So. 2d 689, 690
(1948); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Hancock, 514 P.2d 236, 238 (Alaska 1973); Gila
Water Co. v. Gila Land & Cattle Co., 28 Ariz. 531, 534, 238 P. 336, 337 (1925);
Gregory v. Walker, 239 Ark. 415, 419, 389 S.W.2d 892, 895 (1965) (superseded
by statute, see Steele v. Murphy, 279 Ark. 235, 650 S.W.2d 573 (1983)); Hillman
v. Bray Lines Inc., 41 Colo. App. 493, 497, 591 P.2d 1332, 1336 (1979), aff'd,
625 P.2d 364 (Colo. 1980); Globe Motors, Inc. v. Noonan, 106 Ga. App. 486,
490, 127 S.E.2d 320, 324 (1962); Jay Clutter Custom Digging v. English, 181 Ind.
App. 603, 608, 393 N.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1983); Nelson v. Hy-Grade Constr. &
Materials, Inc., 215 Kan. 631, 635, 527 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1974); Wheeler v. Chadwell,
343 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Ky. 1961); Kentucky Transp. Co. v. Campbell, 299 Ky. 555,
559, 186 S.W.2d 409, 411-12 (1945); Borey v. Manno, 19 La. App. 270, 271-72,
140 So. 109, 111 (1932); Antokol v. Barber, 248 Mass. 393, 396, 143 N.E. 350,
352 (1924); Young v. Servair Inc., 33 Mich. App. 643, 645, 190 N.W.2d 316, 317
(1971); National Steel Corp. v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 574 F.2d 339, 343 (6th
Cir. 1978) (applying Michigan law) (plaintiff entitled to recover either value of use
or amount paid for substitute); Allen v. Brown, 159 Minn. 61, 62, 198 N.W. 137,
137 (1924); Pelican Trucking Co. v. Rossetti, 251 Miss. 37, 43-44, 170 So. 2d 573,
574 (1965); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Jumper, 241 Miss. 339, 344, 130 So.
2d 922, 923 (1961); Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis
& Omaha Ry., 147 Neb. 880, 886, 25 N.W.2d 396, 400 (1947); Rogers v. Nelson,
97 N.H. 72, 75, 80 A.2d 391, 393 (1951); Smith Motor Car Corp. v. Universal
Credit Co., 154 Misc. 100, 104, 275 N.Y.S. 538, 543 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1934);
Roberts v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 273 N.C. 600, 607, 160 S.E.2d 712, 718
(1968); Shepherd v. Hub Lumber Co., 273 Or. 331, 347, 541 P.2d 439, 447 (1975);
Holt v. Pariser, 161 Pa. Super. 315, 319-20, 54 A.2d 89, 91 (1947); Petroleum
Heat & Power v. United Elec. Rys. Co., 150 A. 259, 261 (R.I. 1930); Standard
Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81 S.C. 181, 183, 62 S.E. 150, 151 (1908); Landeen
v. Yonker, Inc., 84 S.D. 600, 603, 175 N.W.2d 50, 51 (1970); Schroeder Lumber
Co. v. U.F. Merritt, 323 S.W.2d 163, 165-66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Production
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of damages, some courts require actual rental of a substitute 22 to
be entitled to recovery. Other courts do not. 224 A final measure of
damages, in appropriate circumstances, is lost profits "5 as a result
Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 356, 280 N.W.2d 118, 124 (1979);
FHA v. Redland, 695 P.2d 1031, 1038 (Wyo. 1985).
223. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Chadwell, 343 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Ky. 1961) (plaintiff
awarded cost of substitute over defendant's objection that plaintiff had spare and
substitute not needed); Borey v. Manno, 19 La. App. 270, 272, 140 So. 109, 111
(1932) (plaintiff needed truck in business and actually hired another while his was
unavailable, plaintiff entitled to recover cost of substitute); Antokol v. Barber, 248
Mass. 393, 396, 143 N.E. 350, 352 (1924) (plaintiff entitled to cost of hiring
replacement in open market); Young v. Servair, Inc., 33 Mich. App. 643, 645,
190 N.W.2d 316, 317 (1971) (good faith effort to replace and inability to do so
required before recovery of loss of use will be allowed); Rogers v. Nelson, 97
N.H. 72, 75, 80 A.2d 391, 393 (1951). (cost of other reasonable means of transportation in excess of what plaintiff's vehicle would have cost to run during that
period); Norvell & Wallace v. Lester, 14 Tenn. App. 62 (1931) (plaintiff entitled
to cost of substitute actually hired).
224. See, e.g., Wilson & Co. v. Sims, 250 Ala. 414, 415, 34 So. 2d 689, 690
(1948); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Hancock, 514 P.2d 236, 238 (Alaska 1973); Hillman
v. Bray Lines, Inc., 41 Colo. App. 493, 497, 591 P.2d 1332, 1336 (1979), aff'd,
625 P.2d 364 (Colo. 1979); Globe Motors, Inc. v. Noonan, 106 Ga. App. 486,
127 S.E.2d 320, 324 (1962); Pelican Trucking Co. v. Rossetti, 251 Miss. 37, 4344, 170 So. 2d 573, 574 (1965); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Jumper, 241 Miss.
339, 343-44, 130 So. 2d 922, 923 (1961); Murphy v. New York City Ry., 58 Misc.
237, 239, 108 N.Y.S. 1021, 1023 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1908) (Gildersleeve, J. concurring); Roberts v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 273 N.C. 600, 607, 160 S.E.2d
712, 718 (1968).
225. See, e.g., Williams v. Eckert, 643 P.2d 991, 996 (Alaska 1982) (award of
lost profits allowed if actual loss shown and reasonable basis upon which to compute the award); Stevens v. Mid-Continent Invs., Inc., 257 Ark. 439, 439, 517
S.W.2d 208, 209 (1975) (lost profits allowable); Power Equip. Co. v. Fulton, 32
Colo. App. 430, 432-33, 513 P.2d 234, 236 (1973) (in breach of warranty case,
proper measure of loss of use for commercial chattel is lost net profits); Salmon
Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544
P.2d 306, 309 (1975) (breach of warranty damages include cost of repair, replacement
of defective property and commercial loss for inadequate value plus lost profits);
Karlin v. Inland Steel Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d 183, 187, 395 N.E.2d 1038, 1041 (1979)
(lost profits awarded for reasonable time required to repair truck); Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dercach, 450 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (loss of use
damages may be measured by lost profits when such profits are ascertainable);
First Nat'l Bank v. Olive, 330 So. 2d 568, 571 (Miss. 1976); (lost profits not
favored remedy but allowable if no substitute was available); National Dairy Prods.
Corp. v. Jumper, 241 Miss. 339, 344, 130 So. 2d 922, 923 (1961) (same); Interpool
Ltd. v. Universal Maritime Servs. Corp., 1983 A.M.C. 1082, 1083 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1982) (lost profits allowed when demand exceeds available supply
during period of wrongful detention); Graves v. Baltimore & New York Ry., 76
N.J.L. 362, 364, 69 A. 971, 972 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1908) (same); Bullock v. Hass,
280 Or. 501, 505, 571 P.2d 902, 904 (1977) (lost profits if properly proved acceptable
measure of loss of use); Standard Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81 S.C. 181,
183, 62 S.E. 150, 151 (1908) (lost profits allowed if not speculative); Somerville
v. Dellosa, 133 W. Va. 435, 445, 56 S.E.2d 756, 763 (1949) (if not possible to
get replacement, then earnings of chattel are relevant on question of damages).
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of the deprivation. 226 Except in a distinct minority of jurisdictions, 227
the owner of a damaged commercial chattel is entitled to recover
one of these measures of loss of use in excess of the interest on
22
the value of the chattel. 1
Courts have applied the theories advanced for denying recovery
for the loss of use of a pleasure craft in admiralty law229 to nonadmiralty cases involving automobiles used exclusively for non-commercial purposes. 2 0 These courts reason that for loss of use damages
to be awarded, they must be reasonably ascertainable.Y' This theory
has led some courts to deny loss of use damages for pleasure vehicles
under any circumstances, 23 2 because the pecuniary loss is not as
readily apparent as in the commercial context. Other courts, while
employing a more restrictive standard 233 than that used for com226. The measure of damages is discussed in greater detail, infra notes 251-309
and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 220.
228. See supra notes 221-25.
229. See supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.

230. See Annotation, Recovery for Loss of Use of Motor Vehicle Damaged or
Destroyed, 18 A.L.R.3d 497, § 3 (1968); accord The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110
(1897); Snavely v. Lang, 592 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1979); Sharp v. Great Southern
Coaches, Inc., 256 Ark. 773, 510 S.W.2d 266 (1974) (prior to this decision, Arkansas
had denied recovery of loss of use even for commercial chattels); Kane v. CarperDover Mercantile Co., 206 Ark. 674, 177 S.W.2d 41 (1944), overruled, Sharp v.
Great Southern Coaches, Inc., 256 Ark. 773, 510 S.W.2d 266 (1974); MadisonSmith Cadillac Co. v. Wallace, 181 Ark. 715, 27 S.W.2d 524 (1930); Hunter v.
Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 168 P.2d 918 (1946); Morgan Millwork Co. v. Dover
Garage Co., 30 Del. 383, 108 A. 62 (1919); Gammel v. Dees, 159 Mont. 461, 498
P.2d 1204 (1972); Foard v. Atlantic & N.C. Ry., 53 N.C. 235 (1860); Averett v.
Shircliff, 218 Va. 202, 237 S.E.2d 92 (1977); Adkins v. Hinton, 149 W. Va. 613,
142 S.E.2d 889 (1965); McMicken v. Province, 141 W. Va. 273, 90 S.E.2d 348
(1955), overruled, Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d
879 (1979).

231. See Annotation, Recovery for Loss of Use of Motor Vehicle Damaged or
Destroyed, 18 A.L.R.3d 497, 506-07 (1968); accord Bates v. General Steel Tank
Co., 36 Ala. App. 261, 55 So. 2d 213, cert. denied, 256 Ala. 466, 55 So. 2d 218
(1951); Hawkins v. Garford Trucking Co., 96 Conn. 337, 114 A. 94 (1921); Savannah
Elec. & Power Co. v. Hines, 37 Ga. App. 733, 141 S.E. 818 (1928); Weddle v.
Indiana R.C. & D. Warehouse Corp., 119 Ind. App. 354, 85 N.E.2d 501 (1949); Nelson v. Hawkins, 244 So. 2d 656 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Spence v. American Oil Co.,
171 Va. 62, 197 S.E. 468 (1938); Hintz v. Roberts, 98 N.J.L. 768, 121 A. 711
(N.J. 1923); Colorado Kenworth, Inc. v. Archie Meek Transp. Co., 495 P.2d 1183
(Wyo. 1972).
232. See, e.g., Sharp v. Great Southern Coaches, Inc., 256 Ark. 773, 510 S.W.2d
266 (1974); Hunter v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 168 P. 918 (1946).
233. See, e.g., Elliot v. Ticen, 78 Ind. App. 14, 134 N.E. 778 (1922) (error to
permit loss of use absent evidence of value thereof); Sweeney v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 419 So. 2d 985 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (alternative means of transportation
available, therefore recovery barred on grounds that no pecuniary loss had been

1986-871

LOSS OF USE DAMAGES

mercial vehicles, have not gone so far,23 4 choosing instead to allow
recovery for loss of use damages only when the owner has shown
particular circumstances indicative of pecuniary loss.2 5
Despite the stubborn adherence of some jurisdictions to refusing
loss of use for pleasure vehicles, 23 6 the trend in this area is toward

expansion of recovery. 237 The compelling rationale behind these desuffered); DiGiovanni v. April, 261 So. 2d 360 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (plaintiff did
not rent substitute; therefore, no recovery).
234. See supra note 233.
235. See id.
236. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Hannah v. Brown, 400 So. 2d 410, 412 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981);
Stephens v. Foster, 46 Ariz. 391, 398, 51 P.2d 248, 251 (1935); Story v. Gateway
Chevrolet Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 705, 709, 47 Cal. Rptr. 267, 270 (1965) (proper
and recognized measure of damages for loss of use of pleasure vehicle is reasonable
value of use of property during period of detention); Crain v. Sumida, 59 Cal.
App. 590, 597, 211 P. 479, 482 (1922); Anderson v. Gengras Motors, Inc., 141
Conn. 688, 692, 109 A.2d 502, 503 (1954) (owner may, in addition to damages
for physical injuries to his car, recover value of its use while he is necessarily
deprived of it whether automobile was being used for commercial purposes or for
owner's pleasure; it is even possible that compensation for injury plus compensation
for loss of its use may exceed reasonable value of car at time of accident); Catalfano
v. Higgins, 56 Del. 136, 140, 191 A.2d 330, 332 (1963); Eschinger v. United Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 61 A.2d 725, 728 (D.C. 1948); Meakin v. Dreier, 209 So. 2d 252,
254 (Fla. 1968); Globe Motors, Inc. v. Noonan, 106 Ga. App. 486, 490, 127 S.E.2d
320, 324 (1962); Nisbet v. Yelnick, 124 I11. App. 3d 466, 472, 464 N.E.2d 781,
785 (1984); Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1982); Nolan v. Auto
Transp., 226 Kan. 176, 183, 597 P.2d 614, 621 (1979); J.A. Tobin Constr. Co.
v. Holtzman, 207 Kan. 525, 532, 485 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1971); Lester v. Doyle,
165 Kan. 354, 355-56, 194 P.2d 917, 919 (1948); Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 368
So. 2d 1214, 1216 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Hopper, McGaw & Co. v. Kelly, 145 Md.
161, 167, 125 A. 779, 780 (1924); Sharton v. Westerbeke Corp., 11 Mass. App.
Ct. 925, 926, 415 N.E.2d 880, 882 (1981) ("[tlhe fact that the plaintiff used his
sailboat for recreation rather than business did not preclude him from also recovering
for his loss of its use and enjoyment while the engine was being replaced. ...
'What right has a wrongdoer to consider what use you are going to make of your
vessel?' ") (quoting The Mediana, [1900] A.C. 113, 117); Vining v. Smith, 213
Miss. 850, 852, 58 So. 2d 34, 38 (1952); McFall v. Wells, 27 S.W.2d 497, 498
(Mo. Ct. App. 1930); Gammel v. Dees, 159 Mont. 461, 467, 498 P.2d 1204, 1208
(1972); Husebo v. Ambrosia, Ltd., 204 Neb. 499, 502, 283 N.W.2d 45, 47 (1979);
Rapp v. Mabbett Motor Car Co., 201 A.D. 283, 287, 194 N.Y.S. 200, 203-04 (4th
Dep't 1922); Dettmar v. Burns Bros., 111 Misc. 189, 192-93, 181 N.Y.S. 146, 148
(2d Dep't 1920); Naughton Mulgrew Co. v. Westchester Fish Co., 105 Misc. 595,
599, 173 N.Y.S. 437, 439 (1st Dep't 1918); Pittari v. Madison Ave. Coach Lines,
188 Misc. 614, 616, 68 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1947); Ling v. Bell,
23 N.C. App. 10, 12-13, 207 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1974); Harris v. Keller, 170 N.E.2d
305, 307 (Ohio 1960); Graf v. Don Rasmussen Co., 39 Or. Ct. App. 311, 316,
592 P.2d 250, 254 (1979); Longo v. Monast, 70 R.I. 460, 461, 40 A.2d 433, 435
(1944); Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 479-80, 90 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1955); Perkins
v. Brown, 132 Tenn. 294, 297-98, 177 S.W. 1158, 1160 (1915); Allright, Inc. v.
Lowe, 500 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Metcalf v. Mellen, 57 Utah
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cisions is that one is entitled to use his property for any legal
23 9
purpose, 238 for pleasure as well as for business.
The arguments advanced for denying recovery for lost use of a
pleasure vehicle were addressed by the court in Hannah v. Brown.24 0
The court in Brown stated that:
In this day a personal automobile is no longer a mere luxury but
is a necessity for the comfort, entertainment, and personal business
and enterprise of every person, especially a family. It would be
an anachronism to say its deprivation of use during the reasonable
time for repair is not a compensable loss in addition to the loss
24
of its market value after wrongful damage. '

According to the Brown court, when the owner is deprived of such
use, he should be allowed to recover loss of use damages 242 irrespective
of whether the property is used for pleasure or for business.2 3 An
award of loss of use damages for a pleasure vehicle is appropriately
reduced by the amount of operating costs saved, 2" but not necessarily
in a case in which a commercial vehicle is involved. 245 The reason

44, 51-52, 192 P. 676, 678 (1920); Stubbs v. Molberget, 108 Wash. 89, 92-93, 182
P. 936, 937 (1919); Wilcox v. Herbst, 75 Wyo. 289, 300, 295 P.2d 755, 760 (1956).
238. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1056 (right to use is compensable); accord Finn v.
Witherbee, 126 Cal. App. 2d 45, 48, 271 P.2d 606, 609 (1954); Tobin Constr. Co.
v. Holtzman, 207 Kan. 525, 532, 485 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1971); Pope's Adm'r v.
Terrill, 308 Ky. 263, 266, 214 S.W.2d 276, 278 (1948); Schmeet v. Schumacher,
137 N.W.2d 789, 791 (N.D. 1965); Harris v. Keller, 170 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ohio
1960).
239. Sharton v. Westerbeke Corp., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 925, 926, 415 N.E.2d
880, 882 (1981).
240. Hannah v. Brown, 400 So. 2d 410 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981).
241. Id. at 412; accord Meakin v. Dreier, 209 So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. 1968) (loss
of use of personal automobile is element of recoverable damages in addition to
difference between the before and after fair market value); Lamb v. Landers, 67
Ga. App. 588, 21 S.E.2d 321, 322 (1942) (same); Plotkin v. Martino, 192 So. 2d
381, 384-85 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (same), cert. denied, 250 La. 97, 194 So. 2d 97
(1967); Vining v. Smith, 213 Miss. 850, 852, 58 So. 2d 34, 38 (1952) (same); Ling
v. Bell, 23 N.C. App. 10, 13, 207 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1974) (same); Newman v.
Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 480, 90 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1955); Perkins v. Brown, 132 Tenn.
294, 297-98, 177 S.W. 1158, 1160 (1915).
242. See DOBBS, supra note 67, at 384.
243. Anderson v. Rexroad, 180 Kan. 505, 513, 306 P.2d 137, 144 (1957) (value
of vehicle's use is not mere value of its intended use but of its present potential
use, whether availed of by its owner or not).
244. Rogers v. Nelson, 97 N.H. 72, 75, 80 A.2d 391, 393 (1951) (lost value
would be cost of other reasonable substitute means of transportation in excess of
what expense of operation of plaintiff's own car would have been).
245. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1057 (although saved operating costs and depreciation
are normally deductible from rental value for loss of use of automobile, such costs
need not be deducted where commercial vehicle is involved, because any operating
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for this distinction is that had the chattel been available for the
production of income, revenues generated may have offset depreciation and operating costs. 246 When a court actually awards rental
should
value, the issue of whether revenue would have been earned
247
be resolved against the plaintiff because of uncertainty.
Some courts have recognized that the right to use one's chattel
is a valuable property right in and of itself and allow an owner
to recover for the loss of that interest, even when he used the chattel
solely for pleasure. 248 The problem, however, of accurately valuating
the loss of use of a totally destroyed private pleasure chattel that
has no readily available market rental or replacement value may
prove insurmountable. For that reason, the only feasible measure
of damages may be interest on the pre-accident fair market value
of the chattel prior to deprivation. 249 This method has the advantage
of providing a readily ascertainable damage figure 250 while avoiding
a denial to the plaintiff of justly deserved compensation.
E.

The Measure of Damages

The allowance of loss of use damages leads, inevitably, to the
question of how to measure the reasonable value of the use of the
damaged chattel while it is being repaired or replaced. 2 1 At least
four different measures for loss5 2 of use exist, these measures are not
2
necessarily mutually exclusive.
The first formula addresses the cost, either actual or potential,
of renting a substitute. 25z The second formula, commonly referred
costs saved by loss of use would most likely have been offset by revenues generated
if vehicle had been available in business).
246. Id;
247. Id.
248. See Harris v. Keller, 170 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ohio 1960), wherein the court
stated:
The owner of an automobile has an investment in it and has a right to
its use ....

If it is not used in the production of income, his right to

its use is no less. If he is forced to expend additional funds to provide
like transportation, should he be penalized merely because it is not a
productive use?
Id. at 47, 170 N.E.2d at 307.
249. Brownstein, supra note 12, at 541.
250. Id.
251. Husebo v. Ambrosia, Ltd., 204 Neb. 499, 502, 283 N.W.2d 45, 47 (1979).
252. See DOBBS, supra note 67, at 387-88.
253. Id.; accord Desselle v. Wilson, 200 So. 2d 693 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Rogers
v. Nelson, 97 N.H. 72, 80 A.2d 391 (1951); Roberts v. Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc., 273 N.C. 600, 160 S.E.2d 712 (1968); Perry v. Harris, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 216,
197 N.E.2d 416 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1964); see supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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to as the "value of use, '2 54 is a more subjective measure, which
depends upon the particular use to which the owner put the chattel.2 5
The third formula, "lost profits," is peculiar to commercial chattels.15

6

The fourth formula is simply the interest on the fair market value
of the chattel during the period of deprivation.257
1.

Cost of a Substitute or Rental Value
Some courts have taken a very broad view on the allowance of

rental value as loss of use damages. 258 When a chattel is damaged,
courts permit the injured party is to recover not only the difference
in value before and aftbr the injury, 259 but also the rental value of
the chattel. 260 The courts permit recovery of the rental value regardless
of whether or not a substitute has actually been hired. 26' When the
owner does not actually obtain a substitute, the correct measure of
254. See DOBBS, supra note 67, at 387; accord Brandon v. Capital Transit Co.,
71 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1950); Mahanna v. Westland Oil Co., 107 N.W.2d 353 (N.D.
1960); Holmes v. Raffo, 60 Wash. 2d 421, 374 P.2d 536 (1962); see also supra
note 221.
255. Mahanna, 107 N.W.2d at 359 ("measure of damages is the value of the
loss of use to the person wrongfully deprived of the property . . . not the earning

capacity of the property in the abstract").
256. See DOBBS, supra note 67, at 387; accord The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110
(1897); Knapp v. Styer, 280 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1960); Stahl v. Farmer's Union
Oil Co., 145 Mont. 106, 399 P.2d 763 (1965), overruled, McPherson v. Kerr, 195
Mont. 454, 636 P.2d 852 (1981); see also supra note 225.

257. See DOBBS, supra note 67, at 387-88; accord Foard v. Atlantic & N.C.R.
Co., 53 N.C. 235 (1860); see supra note 204. As a general rule, this measure of
damages is no longer favored and has long been criticized as inadequate:
There would be very few cases where the interest would give the owner
a fair or adequate indemnity, and thus two of the fundamental rules of
damages would be violated. The owner would not be completely or fully
indemnified for the loss of use of his property, and the wrong-doer who
had had the use of it would make a profit out of his own wrong, which
the law does not tolerate.
Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562, 566 (1873). In a recently published article, however,
the author stated that interest is preferable to the other generally accepted measures
for loss of use where no substitute has actually been obtained. See Brownstein,
supra note 12, at 531-34.
258. See, e.g., KLM, 610 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d. Cir. 1979); Longworth v. McGrath,
108 Conn. 738, 739, 143 A. 845, 846 (1928); Naughton Mulgrew Motor Car Co.
v. Westchester Fish Co., 105 Misc. 595, 597-98, 173 N.Y.S. 437, 438 (1st Dep't

1918) ("correct rule would be to allow the rental value of the car, irrespective of
whether another car had actually been hired to take the temporary place of the
car damaged and undergoing repairs").
259. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1055 ("This difference may be measured by the cost of
repairs").
260. Id. at 1055; see supra note 222.
261. Id. at 1055-56; see also supra notes 223-24.
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269

damages is the amount that does not exceed the fair rental value
of a vehicle of a like or similar nature and performance for a
reasonable length of time, while the owner repairs the damaged chattel
with due diligence. 262 If the owner hires a substitute, the correct
measure is the amount actually paid. 263 The court should not necessarily deny the owner the cost of the substitute simply because the
rental value of the damaged vehicle is less than the cost of the
substitute. 264 For example, when a vehicle used for commercial delivery, or by an individual commuter, is damaged, a substitute must
be obtained to avoid lost income. In such a case, awarding only
the reasonable rental value of the damaged vehicle fails to take into
account the additional expense incurred by the plaintiff attributable
65
to the defendant's negligence.
Other courts, while allowing recovery of loss of use even when
no substitute has been hired, make such recovery conditional on the
plaintiff's reasonable efforts to replace the damaged chattel. Attempts
that prove unsuccessful, through no fault of the plaintiff, do not
preclude recovery. 266 Alternatively, recovery may be limited to the
cost of a substitute means of transportation only in excess of what
the expense of operating the plaintiff's own vehicle would have been,
but for the defendant's interference. 267 Finally, when the plaintiff
has failed to rent a substitute a court may completely deny recovery. 261
2.

Value of Use

According to "the great weight of authority, '269 the owner of a
vehicle that is negligently damaged by another is entitled to recover
the reasonable cost of repair together with the value of its use during
the period reasonably required to repair it.270 Furthermore, in de262. See Husebo v. Ambrosia, Ltd., 204 Neb. 499, 502, 283 N.W.2d 45, 47
(1979); see also supra note 224.
263. See id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Young, Inc. v. Servair, Inc., 33 Mich. App. 643, 645, 190 N.W.2d 316,
317 (1971); Allanson v. Cummings, 81 A.D.2d 16, 17, 439 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546
(1981).
267. Rogers v. Nelson, 97 N.H. 72, 75, 80 A.2d 391, 393 (1951).
268. Mountain View I, 99 Misc.2d 271, 415 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Greene County Ct.
1978); Mountain View II, 80 A.D.2d 949, 439 N.Y.S.2d 632 (3d Dep't 1981).
269. Brandon v. Capital Transit Co., 71 A.2d at 622.
270. Id. On this point, the Restatement (Second) of Torts is in agreement. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927 (1977) (for conversion); id. § 928 (for
damage to a chattel, provided it is not totally destroyed); id. § 931 (for wrongful
detention); see also supra note 198.
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termining the value of use, it is not the earning capacity of the
chattel in the abstract that is to be the standard by which damages
are measured.2 7 ' Rather, it is the value of the loss of use to the
particular person wrongfully deprived of the property. 2 It is on
this measure of loss of use that opponents' arguments on the spec27
ulative nature of the damage award are perhaps, most appropriate. 1

Because it is the value of the use to the particular owner 274 that is
deemed the appropriate meaure of damages, value of use is necessarily
a more subjective measure than actual rental value. Courts have
attempted to alleviate this problem by allowing recovery of the value
of use only if the chattel has no rental value 275 or by directing that
rental value is a relevant factor to be considered in determining the
276
value of use.
Other courts, in an effort to avoid overcompensation or speculative
damage awards, have held that the ceiling on awards for total
compensation, including lost use, is the pre-accident market value
of the chattel. 277 The market value limitation is inconsistent with
the very notion of loss of use damages. Loss of use damages are
278
separate in kind from physical damages to the property itself.
Compensation for loss of use is directed at the economic loss suffered
by the owner that is due to his inability to use his chattel; thus
market value should have no bearing on the recovery of that component of the damage award. 279 Accordingly, the better view is that,

271. Mahanna v. Westland Oil Co., 107 N.W.2d 353, 359 (N.D. 1960).
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
274. Weddle v. Indiana R.C. & D. Warehouse Corp., 119 Ind. App. 354, 359,
85 N.E.2d 501, 503 (1949).
275. Id.
276. Stephens v. Foster, 46 Ariz. 391, 398, 51 P.2d 248, 251 (1935); Crain v.
Sumida, 59 Cal. App. 590, 597, 211 P. 479, 482 (1922); Columbia Gas, Inc. v.
Maynard, 532 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Ky. 1975); Dettmar v. Burns Bros., 111 Misc. 189,
194, 181 N.Y.S. 146, 149 (2d Dep't 1920); Longo v. Monast, 70 R.I. 460, 461,
40 A.2d 433, 435 (1944).
277. See AT&T, 470 F. Supp. at 109 (value of use is less than market value
because of depreciation and overhead); Globe Motors, 106 Ga. App. at 489, 127
S.E.2d at 324 (1962) (damages may not exceed value of chattel before injury with
interest thereon); Knaus Truck Lines, Inc. v. Commercial Freight Lines, 238 Iowa
1356, 1366-67, 29 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1947) (same); Nolan v. Auto Transp., 226
Kan. 176, 183, 597 P.2d 614, 621 (1979) (same); Taylor v. King, 241 Md. 50, 53,
213 A.2d 504, 508 (1965) (damages may not exceed diminution in market value); Stahl
v. Farmer's Union Oil Co., 145 Mont. 106, 399 P.2d 763 (1965) (damages may
not exceed value of chattel); Harris v. Keller, 170 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ohio 1960)
(same); Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 353, 241 P.2d 914, 921 (1952)
(plaintiff entitled to damages in amount of market value of destroyed chickens).
278. Bartlett v. Garrett, 130 N.J. Super. 193, 196, 325 A.2d 866, 867-68 (Law
Div. 1974).
279. Id.
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in an action for value of the use of a chattel, the plaintiff's compensation should not necessarily be limited to the market value of
his chattel, if in fact the damages incurred from the lost use are
20
greater than that amount. 1
Under the appropriate measure of damages, a court would not
aggregate the amount for loss of use for a reasonable time with
the cost of repairs in making comparisons with the market for the
purpose of deciding the ceiling on damages. 28 ' To hold otherwise
would be to confuse the two elements of the damage formula and
leave the plaintiff without full compensation.282
3.

Lost Profits

Courts use the loss of profits 2 3 measure of damages only in
cases involving the loss of a commercial chattel. 28 4 These courts
require actual pecuniary loss 2 5 in a commercial sense. 2 6 Thus, the
plaintiff must prove the amount 2 7 of lost profits with evidence of
sufficient probative value to establish such loss adequately and
clearly. 28 The plaintiff need not prove such profits exactly, 2 9 but
280. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gengras Motors, Inc., 141 Conn. 688, 693, 109 A.2d
502, 504 (1954) (it is even possible that compensation for injury and loss of use
may exceed reasonable market value of chattel); Gamble v. Smith, 386 A.2d 692,
694-95 (D.C. 1978) (amount for loss of use should not be aggregated with cost
of repairs); Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1982) (no logical
reason for cutting off loss of use damages when total reaches vehicle's market
value before injury); Bos v. Dolajak, 167 Mont. 1, 8, 534 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1975)
(replacement value allowed even though it exceeded amount originally paid); Paguio
v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 127 N.J.L. 144, 145, 21 A.2d 667, 668 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1941) ($500 loss of use awarded for dancing dog whose cost was $100); Nelson
v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 659, 155 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1967) (awarding owner
only secondhand market value of wearing apparel and household goods held not
to be adequate compensation).
281. See Gamble v. Smith, 386 A.2d 692, 695 (D.C. 1978); see also MCCORMICK,
supra note 19, § 55, at 476-77 (value at time of injury as limit of recovery).
282. See Gamble, 386 A.2d at 695. "[The owner] would not be made whole
without recovery for the damages he suffered as a result of being without any
vehicle for a period of time reasonably necessary to replace or repair his damaged
auto." Id.
283. See supra note 225.
284. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho
348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975) (economic loss includes cost of repairs as well
as commercial loss for inadequate value and subsequent loss of profits).
285. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 152 (1965) (as opposed to mere loss of right
to use or enjoy use of property).
286. The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 133 (1897).
287. Id. at 125.
288. First Nat'l Bank v. Olive, 330 So. 2d 568, 572 (Miss. 1976).
289. Williams v. Eckert, 643 P.2d 991, 996 (Alaska 1982) (not necessary to prove
lost profits with exactness, if actual loss is shown and there is reasonable basis
upon which to compute award); Interpool Ltd. v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp.,
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mere speculation2 90 is inadequate. A court will include lost profits

as an element of damages when the plaintiff has established them
by reliable evidence.29 '
Because of the speculative nature of lost profits, the courts generally disfavor using them as a measure 292 when another adequate
measure is available. Consequently, if the owner could have hired

a replacement, thus establishing the amount of his damages, courts
generally deny recovery of lost profits, 293 on the ground that the

plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. 294 Furthermore, when the owner
is in the business of renting out the chattel, the court may reduce

the loss of use award by the amount saved in overhead or depreciation
while the plaintiff is making repairs.2 95 When the plaintiff uses the

chattel in his own business, however, any saved depreciation and
overhead may have been offset by the revenues that were lost because
of the deprivation.2 96 Thus, in these cases the courts should not reduce
the amount saved in overhead or depreciation.
4.

Interest During Deprivation

A fourth measure of loss of use damages allows only the cost of
repair or replacement and interest on the value of the property while

the owner is deprived of its use. 297 Historically, courts usually awarded

1983 A.M.C. 1082, 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (lost profits awarded
without proof of specific rentals which could have been made, when plaintiff
presented proof of 90% utilization rate of its chattel).
290. Williams v. Eckert, 643 P.2d 991, 996 (Alaska 1982) (award of lost profits
cannot stand if it is product of mere speculation); Stevens v. Mid-Continent Invs.,
Inc., 257 Ark. 439, 441, 517 S.W.2d 208, 209 (1974) (recovery of "unspeculative"
profits allowed); Standard Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81 S.C. 181, 183-84,
62 S.E. 150, 151 (1908) (speculative profits not allowed).
291. Urico v. Parnell Oil Co., 708 F.2d 852, 856 (1st Cir. 1983); Bullock v.
Hass, 280 Or. 501, 505, 571 P.2d 902, 904 (1977).
292. First Nat'l Bank v. Olive, 330 So. 2d 568, 571 (Miss. 1976).
293. Id. at 571 (lost profits not favored but allowable if no substitute available);
National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Jumper, 241 Miss. 339, 343-44, 130 So. 2d 922,
923 (1961) (same); Stahl v. Farmer's Union Oil Co., 145 Mont. 106, 113, 399 P.2d
763, 768 (1965) (if plaintiff could have but did not hire substitute, he is not entitled
to lost profits); Somerville v. Dellosa, 133 W. Va. 435, 445, 56 S.E. 2d 756, 763
(1949) (if not possible to get replacement, then earnings of vehicle are relevant on
question of damages).
294. See infra notes 310-19 and accompanying text.
295. Oil Screw Noah's Ark v. Bentley & Felton Corp., 322 F.2d 3, 8-9 (5th
Cir. 1963).
296. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1055-56.
297. See, e.g., Moll & Reiners v. Bark "George," & G.B. Post & Co., 1 Haw.
270 (1856); Dougherty v. Norlin, 147 Kan. 565, 570, 78 P.2d 65, 66 (1938); Just
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interest in trover cases for conversion of a chattel. 29 In an action
for trover, the owner of the property abandoned it and pursued the
value of the property instead, along with interest on the value of

the chattel from the date of the conversion until trial. 299 In essence,
the view was that the owner had lost title to the property, and had in
effect "sold" it to the defendant.) ° Thus, interest on the value of
the chattel is not really "loss of use," as that term has come to
be known, but loss of its monetary equivalent.3 0'
This measure of loss of use 02 is no longer favored.3"3 In juris-

dictions that allow recovery for loss of use3°4 (and the great majority
does),30° or in jurisdictions that allow the owner to choose between

interest and loss of use, 3°6 it would be highly unlikely3 ° that interest

during the period of deprivation 08 would compensate the injured
v. Porter, 64 Mich. 565, 570, 31 N.W. 444, 446 (1887); Blum v. Frost, 234 Mo.
App. 695, 701, 116 S.W.2d 541, 544 (1938); 'Schnitzer v. Russell, 81 N.J.L. 146,
152, 80 A. 938, 940 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1911); Eldrige v. Hoefer, 45 Or. 239, 244, 77
P. 874, 876 (1904); Barclay Brass & Aluminum Foundry, Inc. v. Resnick, 35 Wis.
2d 620, 628-29,.151 N.W.2d 648, 652-53 (1967).
298. Brownstein, supra note 12, at 438.
299. Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562, 564 (1873).
300. Brownstein, supra note 12, at 438.

.301. Id.

302. The Restatement- (Second) of Torts states that interest is an appropriate
remedy for cdnversion of a chattel, but is not the sole remedy available to the
owner:
Ordinarily there is no recovery for loss of use of a chattel after the
point of time at which the plaintiff has fixed the loss,. since in the
measure of damages is included interest on the subject matter as well
as damages for l.osses proximately resulting from the loss of use. On
the other hand, as an alternative to interest during the period of detention,
the damages can properly include an amount for expenses in procuring
a necessary substitute or for the value of the use of a substitute until
a replacement of the subject matter can be made.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927 comment o (1977).
303. Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562, 566 (1873). The court posed a hypothetical
situation to illustrate the inadequacy of the remedy. If an owner purchased a
carriage for $1,000 and a defendant wrongfully detained it for his own use for
an entire year, interest on the owner's $1,000 would hardly be a sufficient allowance
for the defendant's wrongful use for the year. Id.
304. See generally notes 210-50.

305. Id.
306. See Production Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 2d 344, 356, 280 N.W.2d
118, 124 (1979). The general rule for conversion of a chattel is that the plaintiff
may recover the value of the property plus interest from the time of conversion
to the time of trial. Nonetheless, "rental value of the property is as appropriate
a measure of damages as the interest." Id.
307. See Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562, 566 (1873); see supra note 231.
308. In denying plaintiff's claim for lost profits, the court in Foard v. Atlantic
& N.C. Ry., 53 N.C. 235 (1860) expounded on the rationale for limiting recovery
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party as fully as one of the alternative measures for loss of use.33 9
5. Mitigation
As in all areas of tort law,310 a plaintiff seeking to recover loss
of use damages has a duty to minimize the amount of damages

suffered, if possible."' When a plaintiff can repair a chattel, the
duty of mitigation requires that the plaintiff exercise ordinary diligence.3" 2 If the plaintiff fails to make the repairs within a reasonable
time, recovery will nonetheless be limited to that time period in
which an ordinarily diligent plaintiff could have repaired the chattel. 3
Although the duty is one of positive action, it has its limitations.

It requires the plaintiff to take only those steps a reasonably prudent
person would take to limit his loss. 31

4

This duty does not require

the plaintiff to do what is "unreasonable or impracticable." 3 5 The
duty does not demand that a person take actions that would be a
danger to his health,31 6 nor actions that would violate normal senfor defendant's negligent detention of commercial machinery. "[D]amages are not
to be measured by any such 'vague and indeterminate notion of anticipated and
fancied profits of a business'. . . ." Rather, the court limited plaintiff's recovery
to "compensation for his invested capital, while it was lying idle . . .that is, the

legal interest on such capital, [plus incidental expenses]." Id. at 239-40 (quoting
Boyle v. Reeder, 23 N.C. 607 (1841)). Although the court alluded to rental value
as an appropriate remedy, it declined to award it in this case. See id. at 240.
309. See supra notes 251-82 and accompanying text. One commentator has recently
argued that although none of the measures for loss of use are "overwhelmingly
superior to its alternatives . . . awarding interest on the fair market value of the

chattel where no substitute is hired and the cost of the substitute where a replacement
is rented is the most sensible approach." Brownstein, supra note 12, at 541.
310. Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562, 563 (1873) ("In actions of tort the aim of the
law is to give the injured party full indemnity and no more").
311. Mountain View I, 99 Misc. 2d 271, 272, 415 N.Y.S.2d 918, 918 (Greene
County Ct. 1978) ("[s]urely the law requires every citizen to minimize damages
and this case [loss of use] is no exception").
312. See infra notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 325-27 and accompanying text.
314. Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 505, 414 P.2d 918,
921 (1966).
315. McPherson v. Kerr, 195 Mont. 454, 457, 636 P.2d 852, 856 (1981) (citing
Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840, 147 P.2d 558 (1944)).
316. For example, the duty to mitigate damages does not require a plaintiff to
wade into human sewage. See Spackman, 147 Mont. at 505, 414 P.2d at 921. In
Spackman, the defendant construction company negligently broke a sewage pipe,
causing the basement of plaintiff's motel to be flooded with raw sewage. The court
stated:
The defendant claims the plaintiffs were obliged to wade into the sewage
water and either remove the property from the basement or place it on
shelves above the reach of the rising water. The contention is rather
absurd since we are not dealing with drinking water, we are concerned
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sitivities.3
If mitigation would require monetary expenditures on
the part of the plaintiff, he should not be denied recovery for failing8
31
to do so if he is financially incapable of making those expenditures.
If, however, a plaintiff does incur those expenses in a reasonable
attempt to minimize damages, those costs are a proper element of
damages, even if the attempt was to no avail.319
IV.

Proof of Damages

A majority of courts today has recognized that a plaintiff is
entitled to recover for the loss of use of a chattel for a period of
time reasonably necessary to make repairs or find a replacement,1
' 32
while exercising ordinary diligence. 320 The terms "reasonable time
and "ordinary diligence ' 322 have been subject to various interpre-

tations. This section will examine the meaning of those terms as
well as what elements of proof 23 will be admissible in establishing
324
damages with reasonable certainty.

A.

Reasonable Time and Ordinary Diligence

When a court allows recovery for loss of use, the damages that
the plaintiff may recover are limited to the period of time for which
with raw human sewage. It is beyond reason to say that a man and a
woman have the duty to wade into such filth.
Id.
317. Id.

318. DOBBS, supra note 67, at 386; accord Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal.
2d 840, 147 P.2d 558 (1944); McPherson v. Kerr, 195 Mont. 454, 636 P.2d 852
(1981).
319. O'Brien Bros. v. The Helen B. Moran, 160 F.2d 502, 506 (2d Cir. 1947)
(expenses incurred in raising a barge in order to ascertain extent of damages are
properly recoverable as element of damages).
320. See Annotation, Recovery for Loss of Use of Motor Vehicle Damaged or

Destroyed, 18 A.L.R. 3d 497, 512 (1968).

321. See 11 BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 429.2 (1977) ("a
period of time reasonably necessary for repair") [hereinafter BLASHFIELD]; see also
Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840, 844, 147 P.2d 558, 560 (1944) (period
of time reasonably required to make repairs); Husebo v. Ambrosia Ltd., 204 Neb.
499, 502, 283 N.W.2d 45, 47 (1979) (" '[r]easonable length of time' presumes
ordinary diligence on the part of the injured party in procuring the repairs").
322. A person seeking to recover for loss of use "is bound, however, to exercise
reasonable care and diligence to avoid loss or minimize the resulting damages and
cannot recover for losses which might have been prevented by reasonable efforts
and expenditures on his part." Valencia, 23 Cal. 2d at 844, 147 P.2d at 560.
323. See supra notes 333-40 and accompanying text.
324. Nisbet v. Yelnick, 124 Ill. App. 3d 466, 472, 464 N.E.2d 781, 785 (1984)
("[aibsolute certainty concerning the amount of damages is not required to justify
recovery where existence of the damages is established").
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he has been deprived3 25 of use while restoring 326 or replacing3 27 the
Chattel, when the deprivation is a proximate result3 2 of the defendant's wrongful conduct. Failure to exercise diligence3 29 in effectuating
325. Wilson & Co. v. Sims, 250 Ala. 414, 415, 34 So. 2d 689, 690 (1948) (time
required to make repairs); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Hancock, 514 P.2d 236, 238
(Alaska 1973) (period required to make repairs with ordinary diligence); Gila Water
Co. v. Gila Land & Cattle Co., 28 Ariz. 531, 534, 238 P. 336, 337 (1925) (time
during which property was prevented from being used); Stevens v. Mid-Continent
Invs., Inc., 257 Ark. 439, 441, 517 S.W.2d 208, 209 (1975) (time reasonably
necessary to make repairs); AT&T v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 470 F. Supp.
105, 107 (D. Conn. 1979) (applying Connecticut law) (period of necessary deprivation); Teitsworth v. Kempski, 50 Del. 234, 238, 127 A.2d 237, 239 (1956) (period
necessary to repair); Brandon v. Capital Transit Co., 71 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1950)
(reasonable time deprived); Globe Motors Inc. v. Noonan, 106 Ga. App. 486, 490,
127 S.E.2d 320, 324 (1962) (period of time while vehicle rendered unusable);
National Motor Serv. Co. v. Waiters, 85 Idaho 349, 360-61, 379 P.2d 643, 651
(1963) (period of deprivation); Brown v. Steed, 317 Ill. App. 541, 541, 47 N.E.2d
114, 115 (1943) (reasonable time); Knaus Truck Lines v. Commercial Freight Lines,
238 Iowa 1356, 1366-67, 29 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1947) (time while being repaired
with ordinary diligence); Weddle v. Indiana R.C. & D. Warehouse Corp., 119 Ind.
App. 354, 359, 85 N.E.2d 501, 503 (1949) (time deprived of use); Nolan v. Auto
Transp., 226 Kan. 176, 183, 597 P.2d 614, 621 (1979) (time while being repaired
with ordinary diligence); Kentucky Transp. Co. v. Campbell, 299 Ky. 555, 559,
186 S.W.2d 409, 411-12 (1945) (time necessary to repair); Hopper, McGaw & Co.
v. Kelly, 145 Md. 161, 167, 125 A. 779, 780 (1924) (same); Antokol v. Barber,
248 Mass. 393, 396, 143 N.E. 350, 352 (1924) (same); Allen v. Brown, 159 Minn.
61, 62, 198 N.W. 137, 137 (1924) (same); Dean Truck Lines, Inc. v. Greyhound,
Corp., 186 So. 2d 240, 243 (Miss. 1966) (same); McFall v. Wells, 27 S.W.2d 497,
498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930) (same); Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons, Co., 147 Mont.
500, 503, 414 P.2d 918, 923 (1966) (same); Interpool, Ltd. v. Universal Maritime
Services, 1983 A.M.C. 1082, 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (period of
wrongful detention); Ling v. Bell, 23 N.C. App. 10, 12-13, 207 S.E.2d 789, 791
(1974) (reasonable time for repairs or replacement); Harris v. Keller, 170 N.E.2d
305, 306 (Ohio 1960) (reasonable time); DTS Tank Serv., Inc. v. Vanderveen, 683
P.2d 1345, 1347 (Okla. 1984) (same); Kintner v. Claverack Rural Elec. Co-op.,
Inc., 329 Pa. Super. 417, 425, 478 A.2d 858, 862 (1984) (same); Petroleum Heat
& Power Co. v. United Elec. Rys., 150 A. 259, 260 (R.I. 1930) (same); Standard
Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81 S.C. 181, 184, 62 S.E. 150, 151 (1908) (period
of deprivation); Thormahlen v. Foos, 83 S.D. 558, 564, 163 N.W.2d 350, 353
(1968) (time necessary to make repairs); Allright, Inc. v. Lowe, 500 S.W.2d 190,
192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (same); Wheeler v. Townshend,.42 Vt. 15, 16,(1869)
(same); Somerville v. Dellosa, 133 W. Va. 435, 445, 56 N.E.2d 756, 763 (1949)
(same); Nashban Barrel & Container Co. v. G.G. Parsons Trucking, 49 Wis. 2d
591, 600, 182 N.W.2d 448, 453 (1971) (same).
326. See supra note 325.
327. Id.
328. Brandon v. Capital Transit Co., 71 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1950) ("recovery
for loss of use must be limited to the reasonable time the owner is deprived of the
use as the proximate and natural result of [defendant's negligence]").
329. See, e.g., Knaus Truck Lines, Inc. v. Commercial Freight Lines, 238 Iowa
1356, 1366-67, 29 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1947); Nolan v. Auto Transp., 226 Kan. 176,
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repairs or replacement, for an undue length of time,330 will either
reduce33 1 or wholly eliminate33 2 the owner's recovery for loss of use.
B.

Elements of Proof

One commentator has listed several types of evidence courts should
use in determining the objective value of lost use, and has recommended that courts admit only the most probative type of evidence
available.333 First, if the chattel had a market rental value, this figure
would be the best evidence of the value of use and all other evidence
would be inadmissible. 34 Second, if there is no such market, i.e.,
there is no standard for measuring damages, a court may receive
evidence of former net earnings"3 as bearing on the value of use, 3
provided those earnings were sufficiently regular and constant.33 7 Use
of net earnings presupposes that credible evidence exists to support
the proposition.33 8 Finally, in the absence of evidence concerning prior
earning capacity, a plaintiff's last resort would be evidence of the
interest on the value of the asset during the period of
deprivation. 39
3 41
outmoded.
This last measure is, in all likelihood,
C.

Valuation

Loss of use problems arise most frequently when a negligent
defendant deprives an owner of the use of a motor vehicle. 3 41 In
183, 597 P.2d 614, 621 (1979); Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1214, 1216
(La. Ct. App. 1979).
330. Schweitzer, 19 Md. App. at 544, 313 A.2d at 102 (plaintiff made no effort
to effect repairs for eleven months following collision and repairs could have been
completed by a competent mechanic in eighteen hours).
331. Id.
332. Young, 33 Mich. App. at 645, 190 N.W. 2d at 317 (plaintiff only entitled
to recover loss of use for substitute actually rented absent proof of good faith
attempt to rent and failure to do so through no fault of plaintiff).
333. Value of Use, supra note 85, at 760.
334. Id. at 762. Other authorities have not gone so far, holding that while market
rental value is relevant in determining the amount of loss of use damages, it is
not necessarily dispositive. See, e.g., Brandon, 71 A.2d at 622.
335. The obvious problem with this element of proof is that it is applicable only
where the chattel had been used for some commercial purpose.
336. See Value of Use, supra note 85, at 762.
337. Id.
338. Urico, 708 F.2d at 856.
339. See Value of Use, supra note 85, at 762.
340. See supra notes 297-309 and accompanying text.

341. Annotation, Recovery Loss of Use of Motor Vehicle Damaged or Destroyed,
18 A.L.R. 3d 497 (1968).
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these cases, a readily ascertainable market rental value exists which
a plaintiff can use to measure the value of lost use.3 42 The testimony

of a representative of an automobile rental agency3 43 or one in the
automobile leasing business 3" is competent evidence to prove actual

cost to the plaintiff for renting a vehicle similar to his own during
the time required to make repairs.
An owner may thus prove loss of use by evidence of the chattel's
rental value during the period reasonably necessary to complete
repairs.3 45 Not all chattels, however, have such a readily ascertainable

market rental value.3 46 In such a case, the owner may have more
difficulty in proving the extent of his loss. 3 47 Although courts have
used this concept of "no [reasonable] basis for estimating the
damage" 34' 8 to deny loss of use altogether,3" 9 mere difficulty in sus-

taining the burden of proof35 does not justify a per se rule denying
recovery. 3"'

Circumstances will arise that will make it difficult to formulate
a specific rule to guide the trier of fact in arriving at the value of
lost use. 5 2 When the typical methods of measuring loss of use are

difficult to apply because the property in question lacks a readily
ascertainable market value, "it may be necessary to formulate a
measure of damages that is more uniquely adapted to the plaintiffs'
injury."3 3 The mere fact that determining the amount of damages

342. Nisbet, 124 I11.App. 3d at 471, 464 N.E.2d at 784 (reasonable rental value
of similar property for period of deprivation).
343. Meakin v. Dreier, 209 So. 2d 252, 253-55 (Fla. 1968).
344. Graf v. Don Rasmussen Co., 39 Or. App. 311, 317, 592 P.2d 250, 254
(1979) (testimony of individual in business of leasing automobiles for twenty-three
years as to cost of leasing a replacement is competent proof, even though no
substitute was in fact rented).

345. 11

BLASHFIELD,

supra note 321, § 492.2.

346. See, e.g., Snavely v. Lang, 592 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1979) (pleasure yacht).
347. For this reason some courts have been reluctant to award loss of use
damages where the chattel was used merely for pleasure as opposed to a commercial
purpose, holding that such damages would be "speculative." See supra notes 12268 and accompanying text.
348. Hunter v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 30, 168 P. 918, 919 (1917).
349. Id.
350. See O'Brien Bros. v. The Helen B. Moran, 160 F.2d 502, 504 (2d. Cir.
1947) ("burden is on the owner to prove the amount of his loss").
351. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
352. Stephens v. Foster, 46 Ariz. 391, 398, 51 P.2d 248, 251 (1935).
353. Jarrett v. E.L. Harper & Son, Inc., 160 W. Va. 339, 403-04, 235 S.E.2d
362, 365 (1977). "[Ajnnoyance and inconvenience are properly considered as elements
in the measure of damages that plaintiffs are entitled to recover, provided that
these considerations are measured by an objective standard of ordinary persons
acting reasonably under the given conditions." Id.
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will be more difficult in some cases than in others should not operate
to deprive the plaintiff of his proper compensation, although actual
determination of the bottom line damage figure may be fraught with
54
difficulty.
V.

Conflict in New York

At one time, the law of New York prevented an owner of a
chattel from recovering for loss of its use unless he actually hired
a substitute. 5 5 The overwhelming majority of case law later rejected
this rule in New York,35 6 at a time long before the automobile was
even invented.5 7 The modern rule is applicable whether the owner
intended to use the chattel for business or for pleasure. 58 Recovery
does not depend upon whether the owner has, in fact, rented a
354.
What are the rules of this new process? How should it work out in 'practice and how do we adjust for abuses by plaintiffs? These are all complex
issues which must ultimately be worked out on a case by case basis, developing a new body of law which I hope will make dealings among people
far more equitable.
Id. (Neely, J., concurring).
355. See Sellari v. Palermo, 188 Misc. 1057, 1058, 70 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (Chautauqua County Ct. 1947); accord Cardozo v. Bloomingdale, 79 Misc. 605, 140
N.Y.S. 377 (1st Dep't 1913); Bondy v. New York City Ry., 56 Misc. 602, 107
N.Y.S. 31 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1907); Foley v. 42d Street, M. & St. N. Ave. R.R.,
52 Misc. 183, 101 N.Y.S. 780 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1906).
356. See, e.g., Nicholas v. J.F. Mellon Constr. Co., 242 A.D. 771, 771, 270 N.Y.S.
516, 517 (2d Dep't 1934) (although denied in this case for lack of proof, plaintiffs
are entitled to recover usable value of chattel during period they are wrongfully deprived of it by defendent's actions); Denehy v. Pasarella, 230 A.D. 707, 242 N.Y.S.
888 (2d Dep't 1930) (award of loss of use justified by evidence); Rapp v. Mabbett
Motor Car Co., 201 A.D. 283, 287, 194 N.Y.S. 200, 203-04 (4th Dep't 1922) (damages
are allowable for deprivation of use); Moore v. Metropolitan Street Ry., 84 A.D.
613, 616, 82 N.Y.S. 778, 780 (2d Dep't 1903) (owner of wagon was allowed to recover
for time fairly needed to rebuild his wagon-ninety-five days); Smith Motor Car
Co. v. Universal Credit Co., 154 Misc. 100, 104, 275 N.Y.S. 538, 543, aff'd, 154
Misc. 105, 275 N.Y.S. 544 (1st Dep't 1934) (measure of damages for wrongful detention of chattel that has usable value is rental value of property during deprivation);
Dettmar v. Burns Bros., III Misc. 189, 192-93, 181 N.Y.S. 146, 148 (2d Dep't 1920)
(familiar rule of damages in actions brought to recover a wrongfully detained chattel
is that plaintiff may recover value of chattel for period of detention); Schalscha v.
Third Ave. R.R., 19 Misc. 141, 142-43, 43 N.Y.S. 251, 252 (1st Dep't 1897) (general
rule for injury to personal property is compensation commensurate with loss which
includes cost of repair, loss of use, and difference in value before and after repair).
357. See Sellari v. Palermo, 188 Misc. 1057, 1058, 70 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (Chautauqua County Ct. 1947); accord Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562 (1873) (allowing
recovery for loss of use of horse).
358. Rapp v. Mabbett Motor Car Co., 201 A.D. 283, 287, 194 N.Y.S. 200, 20304 (4th Dep't 1922) (although car was pleasure automobile, damages are allowable
for deprivation of use of such car as well as of any other chattel); Dettmar v.

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XV

substitute.359 The loss of use of the chattel is as natural a consequence

3 60
of the defendant's wrongful acts as the physical damage itself.
The rule of these cases, long established, is that in New York, when
an owner is deprived of the use of personal property he is entitled

to recover for loss of use. Despite the seemingly universal acceptance
of the rule in the past, however, recent New York decisions suggest

that the issue is not so well settled.
A. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschaaij, N. V. v. United
36
Technologies Corp. 1
In Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschaaij, N.V. (KLM) v. United
Technologies Corp. (UTC), 3 62 the plaintiff brought an action for

damage to a leased3 63 DC-8 aircraft that, after an engine explosion,
was disabled for forty-two days. KLM, in its products liability action,
had advanced two damage theories: (1) actual financial loss; and
(2) loss of use damages based on the rental value of a substitute
aircraft. 364 In deciding whether loss of use was a proper element of
damages, the Second Circuit took a liberal view of the standard to
be applied. Construing New York law,3 65 the court found that an

Burns Bros., 11IMisc.' 189, 194, 181 N.Y.S. 146, 149 (2d Dep't 1920) (damages
for loss of use of automobile may be allowed against one who negligently injures
it, although owner's intended use is only for pleasure, not for rent or profit).
359. Pittari v. Madison Ave. Coach Co., 188 Misc. 614, 616, '68 N.Y.S.2d 741,
742 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1947) ("[tjhe general rule is that damages for
loss' of use of an automobile may be allowed against one who negligently injures
it ... despite the failure of the owner to hire [a replacement]"); Naughton Mulgrew

Motor Car Co. v. Westchester Fish Co., 105 Misc. 595, 599, 173 N.Y.S. 437, 439
(1st Dep't 1919) ("[s]urely it would be unjust to compel the owner of [a chattel to
hire a replacement] in order to entitle him to claim compensation for the loss of
the use of his'own car. He might, for example, not be financially able, or have
sufficient credit to hire a car."); Murphy v. New York City Ry., 58 Misc. 237,
239, 108 N.Y.S. 1021, 1023 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1908) (Bischoff, J., concurring)
(owner should be entitled to recover for loss of use, "notwithstanding that he did
not actually procure another automobile, by hire, during the interval").
360. Wellman v. Miner, 19 Misc. 644, 647, 44 N.Y.S. 417, 419 (1st Dep't 1897).
361. KLM, 610'F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
362. Id.
363. "When, the chattel is leased, authority is sparse. Yet the actual rental paid
should be no less a measure than a rental that is hypothetical." Id. at 1056.
364. Id. at 1054.
365. It should be noted that federal courts are constrained to apply state law
regarding damages:
It is an anomaly of federal jurisprudence that in an age of intercontinental
air travel we must resort to state law which is historically based upon
the loss of use of a horse. Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkinis, . . . we must

apply a state law of damages when an aircraft is put out of use by the
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owner or lessee of a commercial vehicle may recover loss of use
damages, in addition to actual physical damages to the property.
The court found the appropriate measure of damages to be based
on rental value and held that the owner or lessee need not prove

that a substitute was required to cover the loss -of the damaged
chattel. 36 In rejecting the defendant's argument that Brooklyn Eastern TerminalP67 prohibited the recovery of rental value without showing either that the plaintiff hired a substitute or that it suffered
financial loss by not hiring a substitute,3 6 the court held that the
case before it was distinguishable and that Brooklyn Eastern was
therefore not controlling.3 69 The court reasoned that the injured party
has the right to use the property,3 70 and that this right of use means

that ownership of an item of property carries with it the right to
use and control it. 7I Therefore, if a defendant tortiously injures,
interferes with, destroys or takes a chattel, the plaintiff has suffered

negligence or breach of warranty of the manufacturer. . . . The principles
of law, though scarcely immutable, do tend to survive the advances of
technological improvement in their answer to the perennial questions of
how damage should be compensated.
KLM, 610 F.2d at 1055 (citations omitted).
366. See id. at 1055-56.
367. 287 U.S. 170 (1932).
368. See 610 F.2d at 1057.
369. The court distinguished the KLM case on the following facts: (1) there was
no static number of passengers unlike the situation in Brooklyn, see id.; (2) it was
uncertain whether KLM was able to make up for the loss of use by carrying as
many passengers as before, whereas in Brooklyn, the plaintiff lost no passengers
because they were able to work two other tugboats overtime, see id.; (3) there was
no proof that KLM had worked its remaining aircraft overtime, unlike the plaintiff
in Brooklyn, see id.; (4) in Brooklyn there was a limited number of passengers
(car-floats), but in KLM,-the number of potential passengers was far greater and
more cyclical, see id.; (5) the court also relied on the fact that the facts before
it in KLM were far more complex than those in Brooklyn. See id.
It is a relatively simple matter to determine whether two tugboats are
able to tow the same number of car-floats as three tugboats. It is far
more complex to determine whether an airline was able to carry all of
the potential passengers after the loss of one of its aircraft.
-Id.

370. Id.
The theory behind the allowance of damages for loss of use is that it
is not the actual use but the right to use that is compensable. This is
as true when the damaged property was employed in a commercial
enterprise as when it was devoted to use for pleasure. . . . It is no answer
then to say to the victim of the tort: since you have failed to prove that
you would have made a net profit from use of the damaged property,
you may take nothing. For it is the right to use that marks the value.
Id. at 1056 (emphasis in original).
371. Id.
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a loss of the use of one of the valuable rights or interests in

property-the right to use the property. Thus, a court that awards
the plaintiff only the cost of repair or the decrease in market value

fails to recognize that the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of
this property interest during the time reasonably needed to repair
or replace.37 2 The court concluded that the appropriate measure of
damages for lost use was rental value, but neglected to set forth
how rental value was to be measured if the plaintiff had not actually
373
rented a substitute.
B.

74
Mountain View Coach Lines v. Hartnett'

75
In Mountain View Coach Lines v. Hartnett (Mountain View J,1
the New York Appellate Division, Third Department took a drastically different approach to the issue of loss of use damages than
did the court in KLM. 37 6 The case involved damages to and consequent loss of use of a commercial bus. 377 The court, in denying
recovery for loss of use, placed emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff
378
had spare buses on hand and had not in fact hired a replacement.
The court denied loss of use damages because the evidence indicated
the absence of financial loss. 3 79 The court therefore rejected the KLM
"right to use" rationale38 ' on the ground that this reasoning would
overcompensate the plaintiff.38 '

372. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 152 (1965); accord Executive Jet Aviation, Inc.
v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 1974) (right to use is compensable
element of damages); Ohio Oil Co. v. Elliott, 254 F.2d 832, 835 (10th Cir. 1958)
(same); Finn v. Witherbee, 126 Cal. App. 2d 45, 48, 271 P.2d 606, 609 (1954)
(same); Pope's Adm'r v. Terrill, 308 Ky. 263, 266, 214 S.W.2d 276, 278 (1948)
(same); Schmeet v. Schumacher, 137 N.W.2d 789, 791 (N.D. 1965) (same); see
also Value of Use, supra note 85, at 761 ("liability of the wrongdoer results from
his putting [the chattel] out of the power of the owner to use [it] as he sees fit,
and the fact that the owner would actually have used it does not affect [that]
value").
373. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1057. Since the plaintiff in KLM was actually paying
rent to the defendant, the court did not have to address this problem. The court
therefore apportioned the rent paid by defendant as the appropriate measure of
damages. The court stated: "There is, accordingly, a measure of damages that the
District Court should not have rejected out of hand-a measure based 'Upon rental
actually paid during the 42-day period." Id.
374. Mountain View I, 99 Misc. 2d 271, 415 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Greene County Ct.
1978).
375. Id.
376. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1056.
377. Id.; see also 99 Misc. 2d at 271, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
378. 99 Misc. 2d at 271-72, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
379. Id.
380. See supra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
381. This Court does not accept that measure of damages. Damages are
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Mountain View Coach Lines v. Gehr8 2

In Mountain View Coach Lines v. Gehr (Mountain View II)-,11
a case factually identical38 4 to Mountain View I,"' the plaintiff sued
for loss of use of its bus, which was damaged in a collision with
the defendant's automobile.38 6 The Third Department reaffirmed its
Mountain View I holding on the same grounds-i.e., that the plaintiff:
(1) had not hired a replacement; (2) had not lost profits; and (3)
had suffered no diminution of services during the time the bus was

being repaired .387
D.

CTI Int'l Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters3 8

Confronted with these two unequivocal renunciations of the loss
of use doctrine, the Second Circuit retreated from its holding in
KLM. 38 9 The court made its retreat in the case of CTI Int'l, Inc.
v. Lloyds Underwriters (CTI),39 ° in which CTI suffered loss and
damage to approximately 1,000 cargo shipping containers. 391 On
appeal, the'primary issue considered was whether CTI was entitled
to lost rental income in addition to physical damage to its property
as a result of the accident.3 92 The trial court had determined that
CTI had suffered no lost rental income.39 3 In affirming, the Second
Circuit determined that at all times after the accident CTI had empty
containers available and accordingly ruled that CTI's contention that
it had suffered lost income was unpersuasive. 394 The court held that
CTI had failed to prove that the demand for containers during the
period of detention exceeded the availability of containers. 95 The

to restore injured parties not to reward them. Plaintiff would not be
made whole by recovering loss of use but would be paid for the use of
a bus that would otherwise have stood idle. Surely the law requires every
citizen to minimize damages and this case is no exception.
Mountain View I, 99 Misc. 2d at 272, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
382. Mountain View 1I, 80 A.D.2d 949, 439 N.Y.S.2d 632 (3d Dep't 1981).
383. Id.
384. Id. at 949, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
385. Mountain View 1, 99 Misc. 2d 271, 415 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Greene County Ct.
1978).
386. Mountain View 1I, 80 A.D.2d at 949, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
387. Id.
388. CTI Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters, 735 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1984).
389. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1056-57.
390. CTI, 735 F.2d at 679.
391. Id. at 680.
392. Id. at 681.
393. Id. at 682.
394. See id.
395. Id. at 683 n.4.
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court noted that the potential demand for cargo shipping containers
is "not as fixed as the car-floats in Brooklyn Terminal though not
as open-ended as the passenger traffic in KLM. And the evidence
here negates financial loss more clearly than in KLM though perhaps
not as conclusively as in Brooklyn Terminal.3 ' 96 The deciding factor
in the court's decision was the development of New York case law
397
since KLM was decided.
The court pointed out that the two Mountain View cases 398 made
clear, contrary to what the KLM3 99 court had anticipated, that New
York law did not establish a conclusive presumption of entitlement
to damages every time an owner of commercial property has been
prevented from putting that property to a lawful use. 40°
The court interpreted the two state court opinions as requiring
pecuniary loss for recovery of loss of use damages. Without evidence
from either party as to actual financial loss caused by the defendant's
wrongful deprivation of the plaintiff's chattel, the owner may recover
for loss of use. 401 Nevertheless, when a defendant presents probative
40 2
evidence tending to prove the absence of actual pecuniary loss,
40 3
the presumption of entitlement to loss of use damages is negated.
The burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who then must persuade the
court that deprivation of the use of the property resulted in financial

E.

°5
Mountain View Coach Lines v. Storms4

While the CTI case4 was pending, the Second Department of
New York's Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide the identical issue decided in the first two Mountain View cases. 407 In Moun-

396. Id. at 684.
397. Id. (citing Mountain View I, 99 Misc. 2d 271, 415 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Greene
County Ct. 1978)); Mountain View II, 80 A.D.2d 949, 439 N.Y.S.2d 632 (3d Dep't
1981).
398. Mountain View II, 80 A.D.2d 949, 439 N.Y.S.2d 632 (3d Dep't 1981);
Mountain View I, 99 Misc. 2d 271, 415 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Greene County Ct. 1978).
399. KLM, 610 F.2d at 1052.
400. See CTI, 735 F.2d at 684.
401. See id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Mountain View III, 102 A.D.2d 663, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918 (2d Dep't 1984).
406. CTI, 735 F.2d at 679.
407. See supra note 259.
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tain View Coach Lines v. Storms (Mountain View 111),408 the court
considered the propriety of awarding loss of use damages when the
plaintiff was deprived of the 'use of its bus. 4 9 The court reached
the exact opposite conclusion from the first two Mountain View
cases-on identical facts. 1 6 The court held that loss of use damages
are recoverable for a damaged commercial vehicle, even when the
plaintiff had failed to hire a replacement, but had instead utilized
4 11
a spare that it had maintained in'reserve.
The court took exception to the first two Mountain View opinions412 ,
43
labeling them "little more than a 'conclusory assertion of result', 1
in conflict with settled principles, and [we therefore] decline to follow
them. ' 414 Accordingly, the court criticized the Second Circuit 4 5 for
adhering to the rule set forth in the Third Department. 416 In the
court's opinion, there is no logical reason for allowing recovery

when the owner hires a replacement and denying it when he uses
a spare.

4 17

408. Mountain View III, 102 A.D.2d at 663, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
409. Id. at 663, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 665, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 920. The court placed some degree of emphasis
on the "spare boat" doctrine set forth in Brooklyn Eastern, 287 U.S. 170 (1932)
(discussed more fully supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text). Under the facts
of the Mountain View cases, since the plaintiff maintained the spare for just such
an emergency, it would appear that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover loss
of use damages under the "spare boat" doctrine. The court in Mountain View III
duly noted and relied upon this fact in reaching its decision. Id. at 666, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 920-21.
412. See supra note 259.
413. The assertion that the first two Mountain View cases were mere "conclusory
assertions of result ' is well taken. In Mountain View I, the court cited no authority
to support its opinion. In Mountain View II, the only authority cited in support
of its decision was Mountain View I.
414. Mountain View I,
102 A.D.2d at 665, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 920 (quoting
People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 490, 348 N.E.2d 894, 902, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
426 (1976)).
415. After this opinion was filed we became aware of CTI Int'l v. Lloyds
Underwriters . . . in which the Second Circuit retreated from [its KLM
decision] on constraint of Mountain View Coach Lines v. Gehr, [Mountain
View Il] ... and Mountain View Coach Lines v. Hartnett [Mountain
View I...]
As we have previously explained, these decisions are contrary
to settled New York authority.
Mountain View Ii, 102 A.D.2d at 666 n.2, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 921 n.2.
416. See supra note 259.
417. Mountain View III, 102 A.D.2d at 665, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 920. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts is in accord:
The owner [may] recover as damages for [loss of use], at least the rental
value . . . during the period of deprivation. This is true even though
the owner in fact has suffered no harm through the deprivation, as when
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Resolving the Conflict

The present state of the law on loss of use damages is unsatisfactory
and unnecessarily complex. The modern trend in these cases has
been toward allowing recovery for loss of use as well as for physical damage to commercial and pleasure chattels. Problems arise
when one seeks to apply the esoteric principle of the "right to use"
to a real world situation in which a plaintiff has actually been
deprived of his chattel as a result of a defendant's negligence. None
of the previously mentioned damage formulas seems completely satisfactory. Interest on the value of the chattel during the time for
repair or replacement has the advantage of certainty and simplicity." 8
Adoption of a pure interest approach, however, has the disadvantage
of potential undercompensation for plaintiffs who have in fact suffered obvious damages, over and above simple interest on the value
of the asset, but in an amount that is not readily ascertainable. The
alternative remedies have the advantage of taking into account the
"right to use" element, but a bottom-line damage figure is not quite
so readily determined. In the face of these conflicting considerations,
New York's Second and Third Departments have reached divergent
conclusions on the appropriate measure of damages. The Third
Department's position is unjustifiably restrictive in its refusal to
grant loss of use damages, under any circumstances, when the owner
has a spare on hand."1 9 Thus, courts should adopt the position of the
Second Department,42 ° with certain modifications along the lines
expressed in the CT1 421 opinion, 42 2 as the law of New York for loss
of use of a commercial chattel. When a person has deprived an
owner of the use of his chattel and he has no substitute available
he should be entitled to recover the cost of the substitute actually
obtained.4 23 If he did not obtain a substitute, the owner should be
entitled to the reasonable rental value of the lost chattel, unless
the defendant presents probative evidence that tends to prove
the lack of actual pecuniary loss. 4 24 If the defendant presents such
evidence, the burden of proving financial loss should shift to the

he was not using the [chattel] at the time or had a substitute that he
used without additional expense to him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 931 comment b (1977).
418. Brownstein, supra note 12, at 541.
419. See supra note 398.
420. See supra note 408.
421. 735 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1979).
422. See supra notes 389-404 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 223.
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plaintiff."" When the plaintiff has a replacement available, his
right to recovery should not be diminished solely on that basis,
as long as he maintained a replacement for just such an emergency.42 6 For chattels of a noncommercial nature, courts should limit
recovery to interest on the value of the chattel, unless the plaintiff
has presented probative evidence tending to prove damages over and
above that amount. 42 7 Although it may be argued that plaintiffs may
thereby be undercompensated, this measure seems a reasonable compromise in setting an ascertainable measure of damages.4 2
VI.

Conclusion

The overwhelming quantity of judicial precedent in New York,
as well as in most other jurisdictions, points toward recovery of
loss of use damages when a defendant wrongfully deprives an owner
of the use of his chattel. A tortfeasor should not escape liability,
nor a plaintiff be left without a satisfactory remedy, merely because
the plaintiff has had the foresight to have a spare on hand in
anticipation of potential lost use. Accordingly, the law of New York
should be reconciled to allow recovery of loss of use damages,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff hired a substitute.
James M. Lee

424. See supra note 222.
425. This approach would obviate the concerns expressed in Mountain View I
and Mountain View II regarding overcompensation of plaintiffs in loss of use cases.
See supra notes 372-87 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
427. See Brownstein, supra note 12, at 541.
428. Id.

